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NOTES
FREEDOM TO SPEAK UNINTELLIGIBLY: THE FIRST
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT-
CONTROLLED ENCRYPTION
The emergence of the computer has revolutionized communications, allowing
quick dissemination of information to large numbers of people. Information
transmitted electronically is often safeguarded through a widely available method
known as encryption, which renders the information unintelligible to anyone with-
out the ability to decrypt the message. Law enforcement agencies argue that un-
regulated encryption hinders their ability to prevent crime by providing criminals
with a method of communication that cannot be accessed by police departments
and government agencies. Proponents of encryption argue that privacy, security,
and constitutional concerns outweigh law enforcement's fears, guaranteeing the
ability to communicate confidentially.
In 1994, the government adopted a new encryption standard that arguably alle-
viated the risks underlying confidential communications. This Note will argue that
although voluntary, this action was a failed attempt at controlling encryption, and
that as a result, the federal government will propose a mandatory encryption
scheme. Under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence, such a scheme resem-
bles a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction, and courts will have to
balance the competing interests involved. This Note analyzes the First Amendment
implications of a mandatory encryption scheme, including possible chilling effects
on speech.
"In some times and places the even more capricious new media will
open wider the floodgates for discourse, but in other times and places, in
fear of that flood, attempts will be made to shut the gates."'
INTRODUCTION
As Pool predicted over a decade ago, we are now entering a revolution
in communications with the emergence of what has become known as the
"information superhighway." This superhighway is becoming the means by
which information-be it voice, data, image, or video-is transmitted, and
consists of all broadcast media, cable television, telephones, and other com-
' ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 251 (1983).
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munications systems.2 This highway runs through "cyberspace," 3 which is
already global and is expected to permeate all facets of life.4
The floodgates of discourse thus have been flung open, as more kinds of
information can be exchanged with more people more quickly and efficient-
ly than the Framers of the Constitution could have ever dreamed. Comput-
ers, once marveled simply for their superiority over both the typewriter and
the calculator, have become a direct line to the rest of the world. Computer
networks and electronic information services provide many functions: users
communicate with each other by electronic mail (e-mail), they access elec-
tronic bulletin boards on particular topics, and large networks provide infor-
mation in all kinds of databases, some of which allow users to download
data onto their own computer.5 "The vast array of networks emerging have
led some commentators to muse that it will be possible for people to live
and work in a world of information [cyberspace] rather than in what is now
thought of as the 'real' world."6
This medium is growing and expanding so fast that few can keep up
with it-especially the law. Providing easier access to and transmission of
information not only can facilitate garden-variety crimes,7 but also gives
2 Andrew Grosso, The National Information Infrastructure, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J.
481, 481 (1994).
' John Perry Barlow "first borrowed the term 'cyberspace' from science fiction and
applied it to the disembodied universe of computer networks and bulletin boards like
the Internet." Charles McCoy, Visionary or Space Cadet, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 1994,
at R20. Nevertheless, "cyberspace" has come to encompass more than simply a chain of
computer networks. For example, Barlow describes the Internet as "a self-perpetuating
organism ... dividing, multiplying, and expanding to fill the vast void of cyberspace."
Id. See Curtis E.A. Karnow, The Encrypted Self. Fleshing Out the Rights of Electronic
Personalities, 13 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 1 (1994); see also Grosso,
supra note 2, at 481 (referring to cyberspace as a "world of information").
' "[I]t will connect every home, office, news medium, library, data bank, business,
government agency, and computer to every other such entity, and to every person who
uses a communications device, such as a telephone, television, or personal computer."
Grosso, supra note 2, at 481.
5 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment on the Information
Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1062, 1067 (1994).
6 Grosso, supra note 2, at 481.
' Some examples are criminal solicitation and conspiracy, distribution of pornogra-
phy, fraud, and terrorism. See Scott Bowles, Police Search of AOL Files Divides the
On-Line World, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 1996, at Al, A24 (discussing police's search of
America Online's computer records for information concerning a New Jersey murder);
Michael Meyer, The Bad Dream Comes True in Cyberspace, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 8, 1996,
at 65 (describing Compuserve's decision to cut off access to pornographic material on
the Internet because it violated Germany's pornography laws).
1166 [Vol. 4:3
GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ENCRYPTION
rise to new types of crimes, many of which are aimed at the transmitted
information.8 In short, new technology can make life easier for everyone,
not just the law-abiding.
To safeguard networked information, researchers have developed encryp-
tion, a process which allows a sender to "code" an electronic message either
before or as it is being sent.9 The receiver must then know how to "decode"
the message in order to read it.' As a result, if an unauthorized person
intercepts an encrypted transmission, the content of the transmission is unin-
telligible to them, and the information remains confidential. Encryption,
however, has the added feature of being nondiscriminatory-it "shields the
law abiding and the lawless equally."" Federal, state, and local law en-
forcement agencies fear that encryption will allow criminals and terrorists to
hide their illegal activities, a fear driven by the fact that encryption products
now are widely available that are so strong as to be "uncrackable" by gov-
ernment cryptography experts. 2
Not surprisingly, the government is trying to control the use and avail-
ability of the stronger encryption products, though it has stopped short of
either banning encryption altogether or restricting encryption to only a few
acceptable methods. Nevertheless, in order to adequately address the
government's fears, the government must enact a mandatory encryption
scheme. Such a measure raises a host of social, political, and constitutional
concerns for the users of encryption, and for society in general.
Part I of this Note will examine electronic communications, including
the use of computer networks and the threats to networked information. This
Note will then explain the functions and use of encryption as one method
for safeguarding this information, along with the corresponding policy con-
See Scott Charney, Computer Crime, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 489, 489 (1994) (list-
ing three ways computers are used for crimes: another computer as the target of the
crime, the computer as a tool of the crime, or the computer that holds evidence of the
crime). See generally DAVID ICOVE ET AL., COMPUTER CRIME: A CRIMEFIGHTER'S
HANDBOOK (1995) (discussing types of computer crimes and the means of handling
them).
9 See discussion infra part I.C.
o See Herb Brody, Of Bytes and Rights, TECH. REV., Nov./Dec. 1992, at 22, 26
(explaining that encryption "ensures that only the person for whom the message is in-
tended will read it").
" Steven Levy, Battle of the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, § 6 (Maga-
zine), at 44, 46.
12 RSA, the best known public-key cryptosystem, allegedly can be broken, but it
would take the world's fastest computers hundreds or thousands of years. Jeff Prosise,
How to Keep It a Secret, PC MAO., July 1994, at 315, 321. Another allegedly unbreak-
able program is Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), an encryption program developed by Philip
Zimmerman, who gave it away for free as a means of ensuring the availability of good
cryptography, regardless of the government's actions. Levy, supra note 11, at 60; see
also infra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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siderations of the government in regulating encryption. Part II will examine
the government's largely unsuccessful attempts to control encryption, and
the many social and political arguments that disfavor future government
attempts at such control. This Note then assumes that some type of a man-
datory encryption scheme eventually will result and examines the First
Amendment free speech implications of mandatory encryption. Part III be-
gins by surveying the array of constitutional arguments that have been lev-
ied against mandatory encryption. This Note will begin the First Amend-
ment examination by identifying the analytical difficulties posed by electron-
ic communications as a whole. Next, mandatory encryption will be analyzed
under traditional First Amendment jurisprudence as both a content-based
and content-neutral regulation. Finally, this Note will examine the potential
chilling effect that mandatory encryption would have on the exercise of free
speech.
I. ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS AND ENCRYPTION AS THEIR PROTECTOR
A. Electronic Communications and Networked Information
Electronic communications offer a number of advantages over traditional
paper-based communications: speed, low cost, great storage capacity, rapid
and convenient access, content-based access, and better reproducibility.13
These advantages are possible because the information is digitized; 4 in a
sense, the information is broken up into bits that are transmitted and reas-
sembled at the receiver's end. As a result, the time required to access, trans-
mit, and publish information has been reduced significantly, and the amount
of information that can be stored is almost unlimited. 5 All of these factors
combined result in the ability to transmit instantly vast amounts of informa-
tion around the world to as few or as many people as desired.
13 Martin E. Hellman, Implications of Encryption Policy on the National Information
Infrastructure, 11 COMPUTER L. 28, 28 (1994). For a more detailed explanation on
transmission, storage, organization, and processing of information in the electronic set-
ting, see M. Ethan Katsh, The First Amendment and Technological Change: The New
Media Have a Message, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1459, 1473-79 (1989).
14 Katsh explains that:
[d]igitalization is a process in which some record of reality is broken up into
many parts and each part is assigned a numerical value. Pictures, for example, are
not treated as whole images but as thousands or millions of dots, each of which
can be identified by number. Words or pictures are communicated electronically
by placing them into a machine that performs this numbering process, converts
the numbers to electronic signals, sends the signals to some other place, and then
reverses the process and transforms the signal back into the original form.
Katsh, supra note 13, at 1476.
"1 Id. at 1473, 1475.
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With the ability to both process and communicate information, comput-
ers operate at maximum efficiency when linked to other computers.
16
Under such circumstances, information can have rapid global
impact simply by remaining in a computer that is linked to
other computers. Information can reach larger audiences
more rapidly and can be responded to and passed on to oth-
ers more quickly. This process of information growth is
accelerated as bottlenecks retarding the growth of knowledge
are removed and as methods of research and publication
change.17
A network is simply two or more computers linked together, and two or
more networks linked together often are referred to as an internetwork.8
The largest, and certainly the most well-known system of interconnected
computer networks is the Internet, 9 which "[b]y mid-1994 .. had reached
100 countries and all seven continents, with about 600,000 host machines
connected, and a user population in the multi-millions. The Internet is now
doubling in size every 9 to 10 months."'2
As the size of networks and number of users has expanded, so has the
use of computer networks in daily life. One need only look to the growth of
electronic mail to realize the personal and inter-office importance of this
means of communication. Even more staggering is the amount of business
transacted over networks, particularly within the financial community. The
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) reports that:
the average number of electronic point-of-sale transactions in
the United States went from 38 per day in 1985 to 1.2 mil-
lion per day in 1993. An average of $800 billion is trans-
ferred among partners in international currency markets ev-
16 Id. at 1473.
17 Id.
18 See ICOVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 130. Networks commonly are referred to as
one of several different types: local area networks (LANs), wide area networks
(WANs), and internetworks. Id. For purposes of this Note, the term "networks" is
meant to be all-encompassing, because the First Amendment analysis should not change
regardless of the type of network involved.
19 The Internet grew out of the first computer network, the Department of Defense's
Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET). Grosso, supra note 2, at
481. "ARPANET grew out of an earlier plan for a network intended to function in the
event of a nuclear war. For that reason, it was designed with no central command
which might be vulnerable to an outside attack." Id. For a description of how informa-
tion gets routed through this maze of computers, see id. at 481-82.
'0 See ICOVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 131.
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ery day; about $1 trillion is transferred daily among U.S.
banks; and an average of $2 trillion worth of securities are
traded daily in New York markets. Nearly all of these finan-
cial transactions pass over information networks.21
Add to that the use of electronic communications in government, national
defense, and in our health care systems, and the fact is clear that electronic
communications play not only a major, but a crucial role in our lives.
B. Threats to Networked Information
While digitalization makes communication faster, easier, and more effi-
cient, it also makes electronic communications less secure than traditional
forms of communication:
Electronic communication is inherently more vulnerable to
interception than conventional forms of communication.
Phone calls can be tapped one at a time, but the tapper must
listen to the whole conversation. Paper mail can be intercept-
ed, but it is laborious to search large quantities. By contrast,
every e-mail message or bulletin board posting is stored on a
central computer so that it can be forwarded to its recipient
or broadcast to all network subscribers. Once stored, elec-
tronic messages can be searched for certain words, phrases,
or names. Surveillance takes on an ominous new dimen-
sion.22
Furthermore, this vulnerability increases as the number of computers
networked together increases. Each computer through which a user commu-
nicates "may have hundreds of other users and may be connected to numer-
ous other networks. At any point, there is a possibility that an eavesdropper
may tap into [the user's] message., 23
Although many factors threaten computer networks and the information
they contain,' one of the most serious is the problem of "hackers," persons
whose goal is to break into computer systems.2' The most common targets
21 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, INFORMATION SECURITY AND PRIVACY IN
NETWORK ENVIRONMENTS 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY]
(footnotes omitted).
22 Brody, supra note 10, at 26.
' ICOVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 132.
24 Some of these factors include human errors, design faults, insiders, natural disas-
ters and environmental damage, and viruses and other malicious software, to name just
a few. OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 25-26.
2 Hackers seek to obtain unauthorized access to computer systems for three reasons:
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include military and intelligence computers targeted by espionage agents,
businesses targeted by competitors, banks and financial organizations, terror-
ist attacks, companies targeted by employees or ex-employees, and hackers
or "crackers" targeting systems solely as an intellectual challenge.' Al-
though the hackers' targets could be private communications, the sheer vol-
ume of business transactions and government communications conducted
over computer networks makes those entities more attractive and especially
vulnerable targets. Estimates reveal that eighty-five to ninety-seven percent
of computer intrusions go undetected.27 As a glimpse of the future, the
Pentagon reportedly is developing strategies for cyberspace warfare, also
known as infowar, designed to both defend and wreck computer systems
during conflicts.'
Thus, the consequences of easy access to information is more than just a
pesky hacker reading someone's private e-mail. The information contained
in networks is in danger, and unauthorized access can create an ominous
ripple effect throughout society.
C. Encryption As a Method for Safeguarding Networked Information
In attempting to minimize the threats to networked information without
surrendering the advantages of such communications, several methods of
safeguarding networked information have been developed." "There are
many ways to secure sensitive data files from unauthorized access, but few
are as effective-or as convenient-as encrypting them."3  Encryption does
not prevent someone from intercepting the data being sent, but it prevents
that person from being able to use the information.3' Encryption relies on
(1) for profit or some other benefit, (2) for revenge, or (3) as a game or challenge.
Charles L. Evans, Comment, U.S. Export Control of Encryption Software: Efforts to
Protect National Security Threaten the U.S. Software Industry's Ability to Compete in
Foreign Markets, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 469, 470 (1994).
2 See ICOVE ET AL., supra note 8, at 5-15.
27 Id. at 3. The Department of Defense recently sponsored a test, wherein
"[a]ttempts were made to attack a total of 8932 systems . . . . 7860 of those systems
were successfully penetrated. The management of only 390 of those 7860 systems de-
tected the attacks, and only 19 of the managers reported the attacks." Id.
2 Neil Munro, The Pentagon's New Nightmare: An Electronic Pearl Harbor, WASH.
POST, July 16, 1995, at C3. "Infowar" is defined as "the effort to seize control of elec-
tronic information systems during a conflict." Id.
29 Tools that are currently available include challenge-response systems, secure to-
kens, firewalls, virus checkers, auditing and intrusion detection, encryption, digital sig-
natures, biometric devices, and separations of duties. OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY,
supra note 21, at 32-40. For a description of these methods and a detailed study of
safeguarding networked information, see id.
30 Prosise, supra note 12, at 315.
31 Evans, supra note 25, at 472.
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cryptography, "a field of applied mathematics/computer science," which is
defined simply as "the technique of concealing the contents of a message by
a code or a cipher. 32 Encryption uses a cryptographic algorithm3 3 to ma-
nipulate the data sent, thereby converting it from normal text, or "plaintext,"
into an encoded or encrypted form known as "ciphertext."34 Decryption is
just the opposite; it is the process by which encrypted data is translated back
into a form the recipient can use.35 Most encryption methods require the
user to have a unique "key" to encrypt and decrypt the message.36
Several kinds of encryption methods exist. 37 One method is a symmet-
ric, or single-key, system in which the message is encrypted and decrypted
using the same key.38 Conversely, the public-key, or asymmetric system,
needs two keys: one to encrypt the message, and a different, but mathemati-
cally related, key to decrypt the message.39 Because of the mathematical
complexity involved, the keys can be formulated so that one key can be
disclosed to the public-the "public key"-without fear that anyone will
calculate the other key, the "private key., 40
32 OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 113. For a more thorough expla-
nation, see id. at 112-13. Cryptography also has been defined more basically as "the
scrambling of information into an unreadable language that only the intended recipient
can understand." David Banisar, Roadblocks on the Information Superhighway, 41 FED.
B. NEWS & J. 495, 496 (1994).
" Cryptographic algorithms are the "specific techniques for transforming the original
input into a form that is unintelligible." OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21,
at 113.
14 See Communications and Computer Surveillance, Privacy and Security: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Technology, Environment and Aviation of the Comm. on Sci-
ence, Space, and Technology, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1994) [hereinafter Hearing]
(statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Director of the U.S. Department of Com-
merce, National Institute of Standards and Technology); Lance J. Hoffman et al., Cryp-
tography Policy, COMM. ACM, Sept. 1994, at 109, 109.
35 Prosise, supra note 12, at 315.
3 This "key" is a "sequence of bits" that is "input to the algorithm to successfully
perform the desired conversion." Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 109.
3' For a detailed description of the different types of encryption methods and exactly
how they work, see Prosise, supra note 12, at 315-21. See also James Fallows, Open
Secrets, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 46, 46-48 (explaining history and princi-
ples of encryption).
31 See OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 37, 39. In order to work,
both the sender and receiver must know what the key is; this is the single key system's
greatest weakness because communications will be secure only as long the key is kept
secret. Id. at 37, 39; Prosise, supra note 12, at 316.
39 See OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 38-39; Prosise, supra note
12, at 321.
40 For a basic explanation, see OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 38.
If A wants to send B an encrypted message, A encrypts the message using B's public
key; and B then decrypts the message using B's private key. Id. The security of this
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"The strength of an encryption scheme is dependent both upon the
strength of its algorithm and, often, on the length of the keys used for en-
cryption and decryption."'" Although not the sole factor, the general notion
is the longer the key, the stronger the algorithm, because a person requires
more time to find a particular key through a "brute force" attack.42
The government's need for secure communications is obvious, but en-
cryption also has many uses for both industry and private individuals. In the
financial arena, encryption is vital for "cash management and electronic
funds transfer services, securities trading and transfer, remote banking, per-
sonal identification number transfers and communication of highly sensitive
business data., 43 Furthermore,
[i]t can be used to protect the integrity and/or confidentiality
of phone calls, computer files, electronic mail, electronic
medical records, tax records, corporate proprietary data,
credit records, fax transmissions and many other types of
electronic information .... Encryption ... protects the indi-
vidual privacy of our citizens including, for example, their
records and transactions with government agencies and fi-
nancial institutions. Private sector organizations can also
benefit from encryption securing their product development
and marketing plans . . . . It can also protect against indus-
trial espionage by making computers more secure against
unauthorized break-ins, and if data is encrypted, making it
useless for those without the necessary key.44
As technological use and capabilities have grown, so has the reliance on
strong encryption. Encryption is more than just a benefit of new technolog-
ical knowledge. In many areas-especially government communications and
financial transactions--encryption is a necessity.
method of encryption depends on the private key remaining secret and the public key's
authenticity. Id.
41 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 109; see also OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY,
supra note 21, at 113.
42 OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 122. A "brute force" attack
consists of using a computer to try every possible key until the actual key is found. Id.
"' Wayne Madsen, Clinton Approves Clipper, Fails to Relax Export Controls, COM-
PUTER FRAUD & SECURITY BULL., Apr. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL
2299724, COMFSBL Database.
"4 Hearing, supra note 34, at 41 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Direc-
tor of the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technolo-
gy).
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D. Government Policy Considerations of Strong Encryption
The debate is not whether encryption should be used, but rather what
type of encryption to use. This debate "is, in many ways, the continuation of
an ongoing discussion in the U.S. about the proper balance between national
security and individual freedom of action."45 The government will continue
to rely on encryption "to protect its secrets as well as the personal and pro-
prietary data it maintains."" The current standard, Data Encryption Stan-
dard (DES),47 a very strong encryption method, "became the de facto U.S.
government-approved cryptosystem."48 Many are convinced, however, that
DES is nearing the end of its useful life, and that it will not be Secure ten
years from now.49 Because DES is not expected to remain secure much
longer, it is necessary to find a new standard, and to minimize any of the
accompanying threats from future strong encryption. These threats are often
separated into two basic concerns: domestic law enforcement, and national
security.5
Although the concerns of domestic law enforcement and national securi-
ty are not identical, they arise out of a common problem-the worldwide
proliferation of strong encryption products. DES first became the United
States standard, and subsequently became the international standard, espe-
cially within foreign financial communities." In addition, foreign manufac-
turers also provide many strong encryption products. One count puts the
number of foreign encryption products at 394, over 150 of which use DES-
strength encryption. 2 Although export controls remain on strong encryp-
tion, all of these products can be legally imported into the United States.
4' Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 114.
46 Hearing, supra note 34, at 46 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer).
4' DES is a single-key encryption system developed by IBM, and adopted as the
federal standard in 1976. It was to be reviewed every five years, and was last reaf-
firmed as a federal standard in 1993. The prevailing wisdom is that DES will not be
reaffirmed in 1998. See OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 121-23;
Prosise, supra note 12, at 321.
4 Prosise, supra note 12, at 321. "A cryptosystem is a set of rules that define how
data is to be encrypted and decrypted." Id. at 315 (emphasis omitted).
4" Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 110 (noting further that scientists believe that
DES may be able to be cracked by "brute force").
o Because these spheres share common concerns relating to strong encryption, anal-
ysis of their concerns often involves unified treatment. Nevertheless, because the con-
cerns are not identical, they are analyzed separately, infra.
51 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 110.
52 Vic Sussman, Policing Cyberspace, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Jan. 23, 1995, at
54, 58.
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An example of the government's interest in controlling strong encryption
programs is represented by the dissemination of the program Pretty Good
Privacy (PGP), which was designed in 1991 by Philip Zimmerman. When
he learned of a possible government ban on cryptography, Zimmerman gave
copies of the program to friends. 3 The program eventually found its way
to the Internet, and is now available to anyone worldwide. As a result, PGP
has become the "cryptography of the people."54 This is a particularly vex-
ing development for the United States government, because PGP is so
strong that the National Security Agency (NSA) allegedly cannot crack it.5
The main domestic law enforcement organization concerned with en-
cryption is the FBI, whose primary focus is "investigating serious crimes
and thwarting domestic terrorism."56 Digital communications and encryp-
tion make it difficult, if not impossible, for law enforcement agencies to use
wiretaps to intercept and understand communications. 7 When communica-
tions are digitized, a wiretap does not intercept a complete conversation, but
instead intercepts packets of information that might contain signals from
thousands of different conversations. 8 Encryption adds to this problem be-
cause it scrambles the electronic communications. The combination of digi-
talization and encryption results in wiretaps that produce unintelligible par-
tial conversations.
The FBI fears that digitalization and encryption will render wiretapping
ineffective, and that as a result "the country [will] be unable to protect itself
See Levy, supra note 11, at 60.
54 See id. As a result of this turn of events, Zimmerman was investigated for alleged
violation of the export regulations, which require a license for exporting strong encryp-
tion. Steven Levy, The Encryption Wars: Is Privacy Good or Bad?, NEWSWEEK, Apr.
24, 1995, at 55, 55. After three years, the government recently dropped its investigation
of Zimmerman, although officials have not explained why. Doug Abrahms, U.S. Drops
Probe of Computer Programmer Encryption Software Distributed on Internet, WASH.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1996, at 36.
" See Levy, supra note 54, at 56.
56 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 114.
" Grosso, supra note 2, at 485. In response to the increased difficulty in wiretapping
due to digital communications, the U.S. Department of Justice submitted Digital Tele-
phony legislation to Congress, designed to force telephone companies to improve their
communications to make wiretapping easier. See H.R. 4922, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994); Grosso, supra note 2, at 486. Congress has since passed the Act. See Communi-
cations Assistance for Law Enforcement Act, Pub. L. No. 104-414, 108 Stat. 4279
(1995) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 47 U.S.C.); Sussman, supra note
52, at 58. Many of the same arguments that have been leveled at the Digital Telephony
controversy are parallel to those against encryption. For an examination of the First
Amendment implications of the Digital Telephony legislation, see Jaleen Nelson, Sledge
Hammers and Scalpels: The FBI Digital Wiretap Bill and Its Effect on Free Flow of
Information and Privacy, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1139 (1994).
58 Grosso, supra note 2, at 486.
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against foreign threats, terrorism, espionage, violent crime, drug trafficking,
kidnapping and other crimes."" At a hearing before the House Subcommit-
tee on Technology, Environment, and Aviation, FBI Special Agent in
Charge James Kallstrom predicted dire consequences if law enforcement
could not effectively wiretap:
I can assure you that a loss or diminishment of electronic
surveillance will produce the following disastrous results: An
increase in loss of life, attributable to law enforcement's in-
ability to prevent terrorist acts and murders. An increase in
corruption and economic harm to business, industry, labor
unions, and society generally .... An increased availability
of much cheaper narcotics and illegal drugs--along with the
personal, societal, and economic harm brought about by in-
creased drug use . . . . A substantial increase in undetected
and unprosecuted violent crimes ...."
Kallstrom also noted that between 1982 and 1992, court-authorized
surveillances resulted in more than 22,000 convictions.61 He then argued
that while undoubtedly useful, wiretapping is not a casual undertaking by
law enforcement agencies. Kallstrom observed that only 919 wiretap orders
were obtained by all federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies in
1992.62 Thus, although officials do not wiretap often, they want to ensure
that when they do, they can immediately understand what has been inter-
cepted.
In terms of national security considerations, the most powerful player in
this debate is the NSA, the federal agency primarily responsible for estab-
lishing and operating an effective unified organization for signals intelli-
gence activities.63 The NSA's activities include "decoding the signals of
foreign governments, collecting information for counterintelligence purposes,
and conducting research and development into signals intelligence and com-
9 Hearing, supra note 34, at 16 (statement of James K. Kallstrom, Special Agent in
Charge, Special Operations Division, New York Field Division, Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation). Kallstrom listed examples in which wiretapping was important to prevent-
ing crime and conducting investigations. Id. at 16-18 (statement of James K. Kallstrom).
60 Id. at 18-19 (statement of James K. Kallstrom). Some would argue that these
consequences are exaggerated. See discussion infra notes 256-84 and accompanying
text. For an example of such a crime, see Stephen Rodrick & Vladimir Edelman,
Cyberstoned, MINNEAPOLIS-ST. PAUL STAR-TRIB., May 22, 1995, at 10A (interviewing
a drug dealer doing business over the information superhighway).
61 Hearing, supra note 34, at 16 (statement of James K. Kallstrom).
62 Id. (statement of James K. Kallstrom).
613 Evans, supra note 25, at 478.
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munications security."' Furthermore, the NSA is involved in the regulation
and control of cryptography.65 Notably, the NSA only intercepts communi-
cations between the United States and other countries, or within foreign
countries; it is not authorized to intercept domestic communications.66
Clinton Brooks, Special Assistant to the Director of NSA, also addressed
the House Subcommittee. In his statement, Brooks explained that the NSA's
intelligence mission depends on its ability to collect and understand foreign
communications, and that encryption can disrupt its foreign signals intelli-
gence operations.67 This argument appears to be similar to that advanced in
the name of domestic law enforcement: that is, if communications were
encrypted, the NSA could not discover or prevent terrorist activities.6' Be-
yond this argument, the NSA has not offered an explanation for its objec-
tions to encryption. Further, the NSA has not explained the "disruption" that
encryption allegedly causes.69 Raymond Kammer, Deputy Director of the
National Institutes of Standards and Technology (NIST), offered this vague
explanation to the House Subcommittee: "Encryption use worldwide affects
our national security. While this matter cannot be discussed in detail public-
ly without harm to this nation's intelligence sources and methods, I can
point to the Vice President's public statement that encryption has 'huge
strategic value."'7 One suggestion has been that the NSA is concerned that
its control of the encryption field has eroded due to an increase in the num-
ber of devices under development by private firms and individuals.71 Al-
though unconfirmed, the NSA seems to have two concerns: first, that en-
cryption will hinder signals intelligence, and second, that the NSA will lose
its role as the primary source of cryptography.
II. GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS AT CONTROLLING ENCRYPTION
Due to the proliferation of strong encryption and the corresponding
concerns for law enforcement and national security, the federal government
seeks to control what it perceives as an ominous threat. The federal
4 Id.
65 Id.
66 Levy, supra note 11, at 49.
67 Hearing, supra note 34, at 34 (statement of Dr. Clinton C. Brooks, Special Assis-
tant to the Director, National Security Agency). This statement was made in response to
the debate over export controls on encryption, a subject more thoroughly discussed infra
notes 72-75, 129-35, and accompanying text.
68 Hoffman, et al., supra note 34, at 114.
" Evans, supra note 25, at 487 (noting that some in the software industry have tried
to determine the source of disruption caused by encryption).
70 Hearing, supra note 34, at 47 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer) (emphasis
added).
7' Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 114.
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government's actions in the areas of the export controls imposed on strong
encryption, its adoption of the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) as a
voluntary standard, and, arguably, its attempts to constructively mandate
EES by making it the de facto standard for the United States, provide strong
evidence that the government will not leave encryption in the hands of pri-
vate individuals or companies. This section will examine the government's
attempts to control encryption, and the responses to those attempts both
from the public and from private industry.
A. Export Controls
Distribution of strong encryption outside of the United States is strictly
governed by export controls." "U.S. export controls policy continues to
categorize many encryption items as 'munitions-related,' thereby subjecting
them to applicable export laws."73 Accordingly, exportation of strong en-
cryption requires a license. The licensing procedure includes a thorough
review of the application by the NSA.74 Export controls on encryption are
arguably designed to have several effects on the spread and use of technolo-
gy: first, export controls limit the availability of strategic encryption; second,
the controls limit availability of strong encryption which would hinder the
NSA's signals intelligence; third, they slow the use of encryption; and
fourth, they allow the NSA to assess commercially available encryption.75
B. Adoption of the Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES)
The recognized need for strong encryption, coupled with the fear of its
misuse, led the Clinton Administration to approve the adoption of a new
encryption standard." After a period of review and hearings, Escrow En-
72 This subject has been written on extensively, and therefore will be treated here
only briefly. For a detailed analysis, see Evans, supra note 25. Cryptography can fall
under the Arms Export Control Act and International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR) administered by the State Department, or it may come within the Export Ad-
ministration Act (EAA) or Export Administration Regulations (EAR), administered by
the Commerce Department. For a more precise description of how cryptography fits
within current regulations, see OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 150-54.
"3 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 113. Recently, these regulations have come
under fire, and several lawsuits have been filed challenging the application of the cryp-
tography regulations. See discussion infra notes 221-23 and accompanying text.
4 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 113. This includes exporting products utilizing
DES, which is already available throughout the rest of the world. Id.
7 Evans, supra note 25, at 488.
76 See White House, Office of Press Secretary, Press Release on 'Clipper Chip'
Encryption Initiative, Apr. 16, 1993, available in WESTLAW, 1993 WL 357773,
PRES-DAILY Database [hereinafter Press Release].
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cryption Standard (EES), was formally adopted on February 4, 1994 as a
voluntary government standard.77 The standard was approved to protect
sensitive but unclassified data telecommunications, including voice, facsimi-
le, and computer information communicated in a telephone system.78 The
standard is applicable to, but not mandated for, all federal departments and
agencies and their contractors; EES is voluntary for the private sector.
79
EES is a single-key encryption method8" which utilizes an algorithm
known as SKIPJACK and a Law Enforcement Access Field (LEAF). 1 Un-
like many methods that are available as software, these two items are encod-
ed into an electronic device or chip, which is then physically implanted in
the particular device used, such as a telephone, fax machine, or computer.82
This encryption standard is commonly known as the "Clipper Chip."
The most controversial aspect of EES is its "key escrowing" feature.
Each chip is programmed with the algorithm, an identification number
unique to that chip, and a "unique key," which allows the communications
to be encrypted.83 At the time of programming, the unique key is split into
two unrelated halves. Each half is held in escrow by separate escrow
agents.84 One half of the key is held by NIST and the other half by the
Automated Systems Division of the Treasury Department.8 5 The key es-
crow feature allows law enforcement officials to decipher encrypted commu-
nications they intercept pursuant to a wiretap, provided that the message was
encrypted using EES.86 When faced with communications that have been
encrypted with EES, law enforcement officials can then obtain the two
halves of the key from each of the escrow agents and decrypt the message.8
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997, 6003 (1994). This
standard became effective March 11, 1994. Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.
o See discussion supra note 38 and accompanying text.
81 Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. at 6003.
82 Id. The chip is also designed to prevent reverse engineering; attempting to take
the chip apart to learn how it works results in the destruction of the chip. Id.
83 See Geoffrey R. Greiveldinger, Digital Telephony and Key-Escrow Encryption
Initiatives, 41 FED. B. NEWS & J. 505, 508 (1994). For the technical explanation, see
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. at 5997.
Greiveldinger, supra note 83, at 508.
95 Id.
s6 If agents encounter unintelligible communications, they run the communications
through a decrypt processor, which can tell them first, whether key escrow encryption is
being used, and second, the unique identification number of the chip. Id. at 508. The
technical explanation of exactly how this is done involves the Law Enforcement Access
Field (LEAF) creation method that is implemented in every chip. See OTA, INFORMA-
TION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 64-65.
87 When requesting the key components, agents must: (1) identify themselves and
their agency; (2) certify that they are conducting a lawful wiretap (3) specify the
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The EES standard was publicized as the best of all worlds."8 First, it
provides the government and the private sector with a strong encryption
method. The SKIPJACK algorithm, developed by the NSA, is reportedly
sixteen million times stronger than DES, the current standard. 9 Second,
EES allows government officials to decipher intercepted communications,
thereby furthering the goals of law enforcement and national security. Third,
security and privacy are maintained because the key components are unrelat-
ed, so knowledge of one half of the key does not provide the ability to
determine the complete key."0 Fourth, each half of the key is itself encrypt-
ed, so that even the escrow agents do not see their respective halves in their
decrypted form.9 Finally, strict procedures must be followed before the
two halves of the key are disclosed.92
C. Government Attempts to Constructively Mandate EES: Forcing a De
Facto Standard
When it approved the adoption of EES, the federal government an-
nounced that the standard was voluntary, and that it would remain so. 9 In
his prepared statement before the House Subcommittee, Deputy Director
Kammer reaffirmed the Administration's earlier position that it "would not
be seeking legislation to restrict the use, manufacture, or sale of encryption
products in the U.S."94 Nevertheless, even accepting that the current Ad-
ministration will not change its position on this point, and assuming that any
future Administration would follow a similar "hands off" approach, the
government could undertake certain actions to ensure that EES would even-
tually become "either the only device or the predominant device available
on the market."95 Thus, government could aid the process by which EES
source of the wiretap authority and the termination date; and (4) provide the chip identi-
fication number. Id. In addition, a government attorney involved in the matter must
confirm that a wiretap has been lawfully authorized. Greiveldinger, supra note 83, at
508.
88 See Press Release, supra note 76.
89 Greiveldinger, supra note 83, at 508. Part of this difference in strength is due to
the fact that SKIPJACK is an 80-bit algorithm whereas DES has 56 bits, but the actual
strength of SKIPJACK is unknown, because the government has kept it classified.
OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 118 n.7.
' Greiveldinger, supra note 83, at 508.
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Id.
' Hearing, supra note 34, at 47 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Deputy Direc-
tor, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology).
' Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 112 (citing Dorothy Denning, Georgetown Uni-
versity professor and one of the most notable advocates of EES).
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"naturally" becomes the accepted standard without actually mandating EES
or outlawing the use of any other encryption method. Three areas of govern-
ment activity arguably illustrate why EES could not be considered truly
voluntary: first, the government's adoption of EES as a federal standard;
second, the government's attempts to influence the encryption market; and
third, remaining export controls on encryption. Although such activities do
not constitute an overt mandate, they do signal the government's intent to
control the availability and use of strong encryption.
By adopting EES as a federal standard, the government took the first
step toward making EES the de facto standard. By their nature, standards
allow products to work together more easily and at a lower cost. Further,
standards serve to provide predictability in the market.96 This is especially
important in networks in which a need for compatibility is great.97 There-
fore, even weak encryption could gain acceptance in the market and become
the de facto standard simply because more people are using it. In this sce-
nario, individuals would still be able to use strong encryption, but the num-
ber of people they could communicate with would be small.98 As a result,
"people who buy a nonstandard system might find themselves with an
untappable phone but no one to call."99
The government also intended to influence the encryption market
through its purchasing power. By utilizing its market power, the government
could arguably drive down the cost of EES and give it a head start on be-
coming the global standard." The government was forthcoming about
such plans for EES: "NSA has stated numerous times that, through govern-
ment procurement, it expects to create a large enough market to make Clip-
per a de facto standard.' '.. There also were reports that the government
would require the installation of EES as a condition for awarding
contracts,' 2 a notion confirmed by Deputy Director Kammer." 3
96 OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 46.
See id. at 47.
98 See generally id. at 47; Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 116.
99 Philip Elmer-Dewitt, Who Should Keep the Keys?, TIME, Mar. 14, 1994, at 90, 91.
100 Grosso, supra note 2, at 486.
101 Banisar, supra note 32, at 499. For example, as of September 1994, the Justice
Department had reportedly ordered 8000 phones installed with the EES chip, and the
Department of Defense was believed to have ordered 20,000 chips. Murray Slovick, The
Big Brother Chip, POPULAR MECHANICS, Sept. 1994, at 116, 117.
102 See Sharon Begley et al., The Code of the Future, NEWSWEEK, June 7, 1993, at
70, 70; Jon Healey, Clinton Pushes Clipper Chip over Industry Objections, 1994 CONG.
Q. 796, 798.
103 Clinton Approves Use of Electronic Privacy Standard, COMM. DAILY, Feb. 8,
1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2317033, COMMD Database (stating that
agencies would be able to require the use of Clipper-installed devices in contract pro-
posals).
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Finally, the government maintains its export controls on strong encryp-
tion, except for those companies wishing to export EES.'° Other, mass-
market software with encryption capabilities could be exported under a
blanket license only if the key size was no more than forty bits."5 By
making EES easier to export, the government hoped EES would be favored
by manufacturers and quickly replace DES as the encryption standard.
Given the government's attempts to influence the market, the need for
compatibility, and the export controls placed on strong encryption, the idea
that EES is a truly voluntary standard is tenuous. EES officially was desig-
nated as "voluntary," but the actions of the government appear to signal that
EES would not be voluntary if the government could have its way." Per-
haps Steven Levy phrased the issue best when he asked:
The Government's stated intent is to manipulate the market-
place so that it will adopt an otherwise unpalatable scheme
and make it the standard. Existing systems have to cope with
export regulations and, now, incompatibility with the new
Government Clipper standard. Is it fair to call a system vol-
untary if the Government puts all sorts of obstacles in the
way of its competitors?"07
D. Response to EES
Despite the publicity of EES as the answer to everyone's concerns, the
response to EES has been extremely unfavorable. In March 1994, a
Time/CNN poll showed eighty percent of the 1000 people polled opposed
the proposal." s Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility organized
" See Rochelle Garner, Clipper's Hidden Agenda, UNIXWORLD'S OPEN COMPUT-
ING, Aug. 1, 1994, at 51, 51; Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 114.
'o Hellman, supra note 13, at 28. By contrast, DES has a key that is 56 bits in
length. The export requirements were revised sometime in August, 1995. See discussion
infra notes 139-141 and accompanying text.
106 In fact, through the Freedom of Information Act, the Electronic Privacy Informa-
tion Center recently obtained FBI documents which advised mandating government-ap-
proved encryption, and prohibiting cryptography that does not meet government stan-
dards. See Kennedy Maize, FBI Documents-Clipper Must Be Mandatory, NEWSBYTES
NEWS NETWORK, Aug. 23, 1995, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2420642,
ALLNEWS Database. Scanned images of some of the documents are available online at
http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi-dox.
107 Levy, supra note 11, at 51 (emphasis added).
108 Banisar, supra note 32, at 498-99. Jerry Berman, in his address before the House
Subcommittee on Technology, Environment, and Aviation, outlined the main arguments
against EES. Hearing, supra note 34, at 62-73 (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive
Director, Electronic Frontier Foundation). Steven Levy presented a somewhat more
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an electronic petition against EES which gathered 50,000 signatures, and
when NIST issued a public notice in July 1993 asking for public comment
on the EES proposal, they received 300 responses, only two of which were
favorable." Adopting EES as a standard sparked a fierce debate, with one
White House technology official calling it "the Bosnia of telecommunica-
tions.'' 0
1. Concern for Privacy
Most of the opposition to EES is based on the fear that people are giv-
ing up their right to privacy by allowing an encryption method with a back
door for law enforcement."' Advocates of this argument see EES and the
Digital Telephony legislation"2 as the first step toward "Big Brother" as
envisioned by George Orwell's 1984. Opponents of EES further argue that
the information superhighway will become virtually inescapable; as mem-
bers of society, people will have no choice but to conduct their personal and
business affairs electronically. Arguably, making the information superhigh-
way so wiretap-friendly will turn the system into "a universal surveillance
machine,""' 3 or the "Information Snooperhighway." 4 These arguments
ignore the strict safeguards that are undertaken to keep the keys secret, and
the measures that must be taken before officials can obtain the keys."5
The issue of safeguards and security measures signals another major
privacy concern. Many people simply do not trust the government to keep
the keys secret, regardless of the promised security measures. Critics of EES
simply do not accept the government rhetoric that the keys will be kept safe
from spies, bribes, or fraud." 6 For example, intricate safeguards have been
enacted, but there is no provision for sanctions if these safeguards are vio-
lated; in fact, each procedure has a disclaimer of responsibility." 7 In short,
balanced view, but covers most of the arguments levied against EES. Levy, supra note
11, at 44, 46.
109 Banisar, supra note 32, at 498-99.
o Levy, supra note 11, at 51 (quoting Michael R. Nelson).
.. This argument has been debated many times over, in all types of media. Only the
basic issues will be covered here. See discussion infra notes 151-57 and accompanying
text.
112 For a discussion of the Digital Telephony legislation, see supra note 57.
'" Grosso, supra note 2, at 486.
14 Sussman, supra note 52, at 58.
It For the opposite view-why EES would violate the Fourth Amendment-see
discussion supra part III.A.1.
116 Garner, supra note 104, at 54.
117 Banisar, supra note 32, at 498-99 (reprinting the disclaimer: "These procedures do
not create, and are not intended to create, any substantive rights for individuals inter-
cepted through electronic surveillance, and noncompliance with these procedures shall
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there is no provision for legal liability in the event of unauthorized release
of keys." 8 Moreover, the NSA could easily breach the system, because
they are not required to get a wiretap if "national security" is at stake, or for
the interception of calls between or within foreign countries."9 Finally, the
bodies chosen to be the escrow agents, the NIST and the Treasury Depart-
ment, are both part of the executive branch of the federal government, con-
trary to the United States's system of checks and balances. 2°
2. Banking and Financial Industry's Concerns
EES also faced opposition from the financial industry, which arguably
has the greatest need for strong, effective encryption. Within international
banking and financial institutions, two very strong encryption methods, DES
and RSA,'2 ' have long been the standards. As such, financial officers were
reluctant to replace those algorithms with EES. 2 1
3. Concerns Over the Effectiveness of EES
Initially, there were two areas of concern regarding EES's effectiveness:
how well the system worked technically, and whether it would accomplish
the government's objectives. Much of the industry's concern about EES is
due not only to the fact that the SKIPJACK algorithm was developed in
not provide the basis for any motion to suppress or other objection to the introduction
of electronic surveillance evidence lawfully acquired.") (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted).
118 Hearing, supra note 34, at 64 (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director,
Electronic Frontier Foundation).
119 See Banisar, supra note 32, at 499; Sussman, supra note 52, at 69, 71; see also
Garner, supra note 104, at 51 (arguing that the NSA and CIA have a less rigorous pro-
cedure than law enforcement agencies).
121 Garner, supra note 104, at 54.
121 DES is discussed supra note 47. RSA, the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman system, is the
best known public-key cryptosystem, allegedly so secure that it would take the world's
fastest computer hundreds or thousands of years to decipher. Prosise, supra note 12, at
321.
122 Garner, supra note 104, at 54-55. In fact, the vice president of a New York-based
bank was quoted as saying that they would use whatever method the government want-
ed when communicating with the Federal Reserve, but would not surrender their current
encryption methods for other transactions. Id. at 54. Furthermore, the U.S. Council for
International Business developed a list of requirements for a flexible international policy
on encryption: (1) free choice; (2) open to the public; (3) international acceptance; (4)
flexibility of implementation; (5) user key management; (6) key escrow; and (7) liabili-
ty. Business Group Gets Specific on Encryption, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK, Oct. 11,
1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL 2420643, ALLNEWS Database. In many
instances, EES fails to satisfy the council's requirements.
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secret," 3 but that it remains classified.' Industry argued that the only
way to inspire confidence that the algorithm works as predicted is to turn it
loose and let the researchers and cryptography experts outside of NSA try to
crack it."2 The government responded that this would result in individuals
being able to use the EES algorithm without the escrow feature, thereby
circumventing law enforcement. 26 Public confidence in EES was further
eroded by a report that a flaw had been found in the system. 7
A more persuasive argument is that if EES was truly voluntary, it could
not be effective in aiding law enforcement, an important justification for its
development and adoption. First, nothing prevents a sender from encrypting
a message by some other method either before or after it is encrypted using
EES."' Under this scenario, key escrow is meaningless because the mes-
sage will remain in ciphertext. Second, under the voluntary system, individ-
uals may use whatever other encryption method they desire; criminals and
others who do not want to be involved with law enforcement simply will
not use EES.
4. Economics
The global market for encryption products is growing, but due to export
controls, United States manufacturers are at an extreme competitive disad-
vantage.1 9 Most other countries do not have such controls on encryption,
and their companies are taking control of the global market. 3 ' Aside from
'2 Some have argued that the NSA's actions in designing the algorithm in secret
reverses the presumption that setting standards is an open process. Banisar, supra note
32, at 499.
124 Both the SKIPJACK algorithm and the LEAF creation method are classified.
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES), 59 Fed. Reg. 5997, 6003, 6004 (1994).
"z See Banisar, supra note 32, at 499 (arguing that "[u]nder traditional standards
setting procedure for security, a standard is made public so that a large number of re-
searchers are able to examine it for flaws"); Garner, supra note 104, at 52 (noting that
"the accepted method of setting an algorithm is to broadcast the code. This way as
many mathematicians as possible can pound on it for as long as possible-as in years").
126 See Hearing, supra note 34, at 44, 46 (statement of Raymond G. Kammer, Depu-
ty Director of the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and
Technology).
127 Banisar, supra note 32, at 499 (noting that a Bell Labs researcher has discovered
a way of modifying messages encrypted with EES, thereby preventing the messages
from being decrypted by law enforcement agencies).
128 Id.
129 See Evans, supra note 25; see also Hoffman et at., supra note 34, at 111 (report-
ing that U.S. data encryption market was $384 million in 1991, and estimated to reach
$946 million by 1996. The world market was estimated at $695 million in 1991, and is
predicted to reach $1.8 billion by 1996).
130 U.S. software and hardware manufacturers hold about 75% of the total global
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the financial loss, many companies have simply decided not to manufacture
encryption technology, while others have decided to "dumb down" the en-
cryption software they sell abroad.' Many American companies simply
cannot afford to make two versions of the same product-one with strong
encryption to be sold only within the United States, and one with weak
encryption to be exported.'32 Critics argue that even if export controls
were lifted for EES, 3 3 no foreign purchaser would buy a system in which
the United States government holds the keys."
The debate over the value of EES has become volatile: the government
sees it as the best of all possibilities, considering the competing policy
choices at play, while the private sector and industry see it as the worst
alternative-treading on personal liberty and wreaking havoc on economic
stability. The worldwide availability of DES and other strong encryption
programs has led some to proclaim that it is too late to put the encryption
genie back in the bottle. The debate has been nothing if not colorful: NSA
Chief Counsel Stewart A. Baker has dismissed the criticisms of EES as "the
revenge of people who couldn't go to Woodstock because they had too
much trig homework."' 35
E. Government Loses the EES Battle, but the Encryption War Continues
The government seems to have already lost a few battles in its effort to
make EES the de facto standard for encryption. The government's original
plan called for not only the Clipper Chip to protect voice and low-grade
data transmissions, but also the Capstone Chip, which was to protect high
speed data communications in computer networks.'36 Although EES has
been adopted as a voluntary standard for telephone systems, the government
has not taken the next step of adopting EES for computer and video net-
works. In November, 1993, Representative Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.) and
Senator Patty Murray (D-Wash.) proposed an amendment to the Arms Ex-
port Act that would remove controls on both software and hardware that
incorporate encryption.'37 On July 20, 1994, Vice President Al Gore sent
market, but only about 50% of the international encryption market. Hoffman et al.,
supra note 34, at 111.
131 See generally Evans, supra note 25 at 489; Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 111-
13.
132 See Evans, supra note 25, at 489-90.
133 Banisar, supra note 32, at 499.
134 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 112.
131 Levy, supra note 11, at 70.
136 See OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 64-65; Grosso, supra note
2, at 486.
137 OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 160; Banisar, supra note 32, at
500.
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Cantwell a letter that seemed to signal the government's retreat from con-
trolling encryption. In his letter, Gore stated that EES would be limited to
telephone systems, and expressed the Administration's intent to cooperate
with industry and privacy advocates. 3 ' With the exception of telephone
systems, the government seemingly has backed away from this particular
encryption method for computer and video networks.
The government's retreat was all but confirmed by the Clinton
Administration's August 1995 announcement that companies would be al-
lowed to export stronger encryption methods. 3 9 The new scheme allows
for exportation of software employing sixty-four bit encryption, as long as a
key escrow system is in place.' The keys reportedly would be held in es-
crow by private companies and would be made available to the government
under a court order.1
4 1
Despite these retreats, the government has not yet surrendered complete-
ly in its quest. Although EES no longer appears likely to become the de
facto standard, the government still intends to control encryption. The gov-
ernment is accepting suggestions for alternatives to EES, but "[o]ne sugges-
tion it will not embrace is inaction. 'Deciding that the genie is out of the
bottle and throwing our arms up is not where we're at." ' 4' Therefore, the
government is not insisting on EES, but is demanding an acceptable stan-
dard that would still require escrowed keys of some sort. 43 Clinton
Brooks, in his testimony before the House Subcommittee, acknowledged the
need for reliable encryption, but also noted that it would be irresponsible for
government to design a system that would alienate law enforcement. 44
138 Activities that are to be undertaken include presidential studies of the effects of
export controls, alternative types of key-escrow systems for computer networks (includ-
ing key escrow encryption based on unclassified algorithms or software-oriented), es-
crow system safeguards, use of nongovernment escrow agents, and liability issues.
OTA, INFORMATION SECURITY, supra note 21, at 172. For an analysis of the different
interpretations of Gore's letter, see Gore Letter on Clipper Chip Prompts Debate over
Interpretation, -COMM. DAILY, July 22, 1994, available in WESTLAW, 1994 WL
2314110, COMMD Database.
139 Daniel Pearl, Encryption-Software Plan Presented Using 'Keys' Held by Escrow
Agents, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 1995, at A3.
140 Id. A November, 1995 draft of the government's export criteria for software key
escrow encryption products can be found online at http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/
criteria.txt.
141 Michelle Quinn, Encryption Relaxation Gets Mixed Reaction, S.F. CHRON., Aug.
18, 1995, at El. A December 1995 draft of the government's criteria for key escrow
agents can be found online at http://csrc.ncsl.nist.gov/keyescrow/criteria.
142 Levy, supra note 11, at 70 (quoting an anonymous White House official).
143 Benjamin Wittes, The Year in Cyberlaw; The Rapid Development of the Internet
Poses Intriguing New Legal Problems, as Well as Possibilities, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 26,
1994, at 5.
144 See Hearing, supra note 34, at 121 (testimony of Dr. Clinton C. Brooks, Special
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More concrete evidence that the government intends to control encryp-
tion is found from announced policy rationales. From a logical standpoint, if
government intends to assist law enforcement and signals intelligence, it
cannot allow the use of strong encryption. Voluntariness is inconsistent with
the objectives of the government. The only way to meet these objectives is
to make an accessible system mandatory, or criminals will simply use anoth-
er system. 145 Critics argue that the government's rationale for aiding law
enforcement
assumes that the Mafia, spies, clandestine activities will all
use Clipper encryption, full well knowing in advance that
their illicit communications would be open for eavesdrop-
ping. If NSA and the FBI believe this, it is a contradiction of
their 'intelligence' activities. The only users of Clipper under
a mandatory standard would be the legitimate, law-abiding
communicators who should not normally be targets of Big
Brother snooping.'46
The government responds that most criminals would be unaware of the
government's system, or would forget about it.147 As FBI Special Agent
Jim Kallstrom so eloquently stated:
Thank God most criminals are stupid! If the smartest seg-
ment of the population ever went into crime, we would real-
ly have a problem. Will some criminals catch on to the sys-
tem, and buy their encryption from, let's say, Israel? Yes.
Will that be a problem? Yes. But it will be a substantially
smaller problem than if we didn't do anything. 41
Kallstrom does not adequately address the problem of voluntariness hinder-
ing effectiveness. This attitude may or may not be justified when dealing
with garden-variety criminals, but with the emerging danger of hackers and
other computer criminals, the idea that they are stupid when it comes to
encryption is ludicrous, further proving that an encryption policy must be
mandatory if the government hopes to combat these crimes.149
Assistant to the Director, National Security Agency).
"' See id. at 66 (statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Electronic Frontier
Foundation).
1'6 Jack Robertson, Get Smart on Codes, ELECTRONIC NEWS, May 31, 1993, at 9.
"' Fallows, supra note 37, at 50.
148 Id.
"' The FBI itself apparently recognized this argument early on, as it advocated man-
datory encryption. See supra note 106.
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The government's retreat from the adoption of EES aside, its insistence
on some type of key escrow, the inconsistency of voluntariness with stated
policy objectives, and the fact that export controls have been relaxed only
on condition of key escrow, all evidence the government's intent to control
encryption. Once another encryption scheme acceptable to the government is
developed, the government will most likely try to use the same or similar
mechanisms in an attempt to make it the de facto encryption standard. Alter-
natively, if law enforcement or signals intelligence actually becomes frus-
trated by encryption, the government may mandate its preferred encryption
scheme. This Note assumes a mandatory encryption scheme will result,
either through an actual mandated method or through a general requirement
of escrowing personal keys, and analyzes the First Amendment implications
of government-controlled encryption.
III. FIRST AMENDMENT FREE SPEECH IMPLICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT-
CONTROLLED ENCRYPTION
A. Other Constitutional Objections to Mandatory Encryption
In order to place in context the free speech issues raised by mandatory
encryption, a survey of other objections that have been raised would be
helpful. In addition to the social and political arguments levied against EES
in particular, and mandatory encryption in general,15 ° such a scheme also
raises a number of constitutional objections.
1. Fourth Amendment
Mandatory encryption, at least in the form of a mandatory key escrow
scheme, is most often attacked on Fourth Amendment grounds-that such a
scheme threatens individual rights and may constitute an unreasonable
search and seizure." Some argue that the existence of the Clipper Chip
increases the potential for government abuse and threatens to alter the bal-
0 See discussion supra part II.D.
"' The Fourth Amendment provides that
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see, e.g., Mark 1. Koffsky, Comment, Choppy Waters in the
Surveillance Data Stream: The Clipper Chip and the Particularity Clause, 9 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 131 (1994); Christopher E. Torkelson, Comment, The Clipper Scheme: How
Key Escrow Threatens to Undermine the Fourth Amendment, 25 SETON HALL L. REV.
1142 (1995).
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ance of power between individual rights and law enforcement.'52 Most of
the analysis has been through analogy to existing case law in an effort to
determine whether mandatory key escrow constitutes a "search" for Fourth
Amendment purposes, and if so, whether such a search would be reason-
able.'53 One explanation as to why mandatory key escrow may constitute a
search is that:
[a] key is not itself a conversation ... but the means to
decrypt one. Nevertheless, there should be no doubt that
absent government action to force disclosure, a properly
guarded key to a cryptographic system would be an item of
information for which the user would have both a subjective-
ly and objectively reasonable expectation of privacy. Indeed,
the entire point of having a cryptographic system is to in-
crease or create privacy. This is especially true in a public-
key cryptographic system, in which the private key is never
disclosed. A requirement that keys (or the means to decrypt
them) be turned over to the government is thus clearly a
search or seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.154
As to the reasonableness of such a search, several arguments have been
advanced. First, although wiretaps permit secret seizure of a conversation,
"[t]he law does not permit the subsequent secret seizure of a record of that
conversation.' ' 55 Second, some argue that a mandatory Clipper Chip would
violate the Fourth Amendment, in part because the chips would be implant-
ed not upon probable cause, but rather upon an assumption, or in the antici-
pation of some future crime, a notion directly at odds with the Particularity
152 Torkelson, supra note 151, at 1171-75 (arguing that the balance of power will
shift to favor law enforcement).
153 See generally A. Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 709, 823-33 (1995) (analyzing
whether mandatory key escrow is a search and seizure, and whether a warrant should be
required); Henry R. King, Note, Big Brother, The Holding Company: A Review of Key-
Escrow Encryption Technology, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 224, 249-53
(1995) (analyzing whether key escrow would be considered a "search" and whether
users would have an "expectation of privacy"); Kirsten Scheurer, Note, The Clipper
Chip: Cryptography Technology and the Constitution-The Government's Answer to
Encryption "Chips" Away at Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH.
L.J. 263, 277-80 (1995) (analyzing exceptions to the Fourth Amendment and their ap-
plicability to encryption).
'5' Froomkin, supra note 153, at 829.
' John Perry Barlow, A Plain Text on Crypto Policy, COMM. ACM, Nov. 1993, at
21, 24.
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Clause's intention of limiting the scope of authorized searches. 1 6 Manda-
tory key escrow raises many of the same constitutional issues as wiretaps,
and seems at least to rise to the level of a Fourth Amendment search, al-
though one commentator has suggested that such a scheme resembles a
regulatory search, such as employee drug testing, for which no warrant
would be required.'57
2. Fifth Amendment
An additional, though less common argument is that mandatory key
escrow would violate the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.'58 Requiring users to make their key available to the government is
arguably analogous to forcing users to disclose their secrets in advance,'59
or to allowing a possible waiver of any future Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. 16' A contrasting view argues that "there have been no Fifth Amend-
ment claims in cases where cryptologists have deciphered messages by
using other recorded conversations of the defendant's to develop their
decryption scheme., 161 If there is no Fifth Amendment violation under
these circumstances, the argument proceeds, then there certainly is no viola-
tion where officials are not using any prior encrypted conversations-as is
the case with key escrow. 16' Finally, some have argued that the Fifth
Amendment would not significantly restrict mandatory key escrow because
the purpose of such a scheme is to allow the government to retain the capa-
bilities it already has-capabilities that require a warrant before being exe-
cuted.
63
3. First Amendment: Freedom of Association
Finally, some critics argue that a mandatory key escrow system would
violate the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of association."' This
156 Koffsky, supra note 151, at 146.
'5 Froomkin, supra note 153, at 830-33.
"No person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself .... ." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
'5 Barlow, supra note 155, at 24.
'a" Scheurer, supra note 153, at 280-81.
161 King, supra note 153, at 254.
162 Id. at 254-55.
163 Froomkin, supra note 153, at 837-38. In reaching this conclusion, Professor
Froomkin performed two analyses: first, in viewing the chip key as a "private paper,"
and second, analyzing whether chip key or session key (which is tied directly to the en-
crypted conversation) could be considered "incriminating." Id. at 833-38.
164 "Congress shall make no law ... abridging ... the right of the people peaceably
to assemble ... ." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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argument stems from such cases as NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson'65 and Talley v. California,6 ' wherein the Supreme Court held
that requiring disclosure of an organization's members or an individual's
identity could violate the First Amendment freedoms of association and
speech.167 Professor A. Michael Froomkin offers a more detailed analysis,
noting that anonymity is essential for some associations to survive, and that
cryptography makes such anonymity possible.6 ' He further explains that
mandatory key escrow threatens this anonymity, because such a scheme
makes it possible first, to identify both the source and the content of en-
crypted e-mail, and second, to identify the receiver-"the person to whom
the target of the wiretap is speaking."'69 The result of a legal challenge
based on freedom of association will probably depend on the outcome of
balancing "whether the interests supporting mandatory key escrow are suffi-
ciently great to justify the increased risk of harassment to political dissi-
dents.' 70
B. First Amendment Free Speech Implications of Mandatory Encryption
"Freedom of speech" is a deceptively simple concept on its face-one
has the right to speak freely without government interference or punish-
ment. 17' When the First Amendment was enacted in 1791, the Framers en-
visioned protection for the spoken and printed word. The Framers' concept
of speech was relatively limited compared to the communication capabilities
we take for granted. As new modes of communication emerge and more
topics of speech are discussed openly, trying to guarantee this freedom be-
comes exponentially more difficult. We no longer simply look at what was
said, but must focus also on who the speaker is and where the speech took
165 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
166 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
167 See Barlow, supra note 155, at 24 (noting that truly private assembly in
cyberspace can take place only with some technical means to hide participants); King,
supra note 153, at 256-57 (following John Perry Barlow's reasoning, and arguing that if
non-Clipper encryption methods become illegal, those using the illegal methods will be
easier to identify).
16 Froomkin, supra note 153, at 817-18.
169 Id. at 818.
170 Id. at 820. Froomkin adds that a freedom of association challenge to a mandatory
key escrow scheme "would increase its chances of success if the challengers could
demonstrate that mandatory key escrow closes off a channel of anonymous communica-
tion that has no true alternative." Id. This same argument is analyzed in more detail in
the discussion of mandatory encryption as a content-neutral "time, place, or manner"
regulation. See discussion infra notes 285-305 and accompanying text.
171 See U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the free-
dom of speech, or of the press .... .
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place, including physical location and medium. With so many contingencies
to account for, it is obvious why many commentators consider First Amend-
ment jurisprudence to be as clear as the federal tax code.
Electronic communications only serve to confuse the issues further.
Technology has provided a tool by which communications may remain
completely confidential without having to meet clandestinely, face-to-face,
or rely on the Postal Service. We have the ability to communicate almost
instantaneously with people around the world, and yet keep the conversation
private through encryption. Nevertheless, controlling encryption while re-
maining true to freedom of speech is a profound tightrope walk.
In an effort to understand the impact on freedom of speech, this Note
will analyze mandatory encryption under traditional First Amendment ju-
risprudence. Because electronic communications do not fit easily within
even the most basic First Amendment principles, the proper starting place
for this analysis is to recognize those analytical difficulties. Therefore, with-
out suggesting any new models, this Note will preface the First Amendment
free speech analysis by identifying and analyzing these differences. Next,
mandatory encryption will be analyzed both as a content-based and a con-
tent-neutral regulation. Finally, this Note will examine the possible chilling
effect that mandatory encryption would have on the exercise of free speech.
1. Basic First Amendment Principles and the Analytical Difficulties Posed by
Electronic Communications
a. Expression
As a threshold matter, electronic communications are logically seen as a
form of expression that is afforded First Amendment protection. Pure verbal
oration and the printed word have always been within the realm of First
Amendment protection, but over the years other activities have been defined
as "speech," thereby receiving similar protection.
Given what has been protected in the past, there is nothing intuitively
discomforting about the notion that electronic communications should be
afforded the same First Amendment protections that other forms of commu-
nication now enjoy. Nevertheless, as Pool noted, the rapid growth of tech-
nology will open the floodgates of discourse-an action that most likely will
spark a restrictive reaction, at least initially. "The greatest danger in regulat-
ing cyberspace, many experts say, may be that this powerful new technolo-
gy will be misunderstood and crippled in its infancy by overregulation and
fear."
172
"' Vic Sussman, Policing the Digital World, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 6,
1993, at 68, 68.
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Perhaps in anticipation of this overregulation, several commentators have
affirmatively expressed the applicability of the First Amendment to elec-
tronic communications.' Nevertheless, application of current law to this
new technology remains uncertain. Constitutional experts question the ability
of existing law to guarantee full protection to electronic communications.
For example, several years ago Harvard scholar Laurence Tribe proposed
the idea of a new constitutional amendment:
This Constitution's protections for the freedoms of speech,
press, petition, and assembly, and its protections against
unreasonable searches and seizures and the deprivation of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, shall be
construed as fully applicable without regard to the technolog-
ical method or medium through which the information con-
tent is generated, stored, altered, transmitted, or con-
trolled.
Thus, the value of expression would not vary according to the location of
the discussion. "Although public discourse will shift from physical spaces to
cyberspace, its protection under the First Amendment will be equally vi-
tal.'
175
b. Media
Although "expression" is protected regardless of its mode of transmis-
sion, how much protection expression is afforded depends on the medium in
which it is delivered:
173 As Ithiel de Sola Pool noted more than a decade ago: "the First Amendment ap-
plies fully to all media. It applies to the function of communication, not just to the
media that existed in the eighteenth century. It applies to the electronic media as much
as to the print ones." DE SOLA POOL, supra note 1, at 246. More recently, Professor
Rodney Smolla explained: "It is clear that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom
of expression may be claimed not just for newspapers and other printed publications,
but also for motion pictures, radio and television broadcasts, computer databases, and
other forms of modern electronic communication, including those not yet imagined."
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON
THE FIRST AMENDMENT, § 13.01[2][b] (1994) (emphasis added).
174 Proposed by Laurence H. Tribe at the "First Conference on Computers, Freedom,
and Privacy," reprinted in Gregory E. Perry & Cherie Ballard, A Chip by Any Other
Name Would Still Be a Potato: The Failure of Law and Its Definitions to Keep Pace
with Computer Technology, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 797, 798 (1993).
"' Note, supra note 5, at 1087.
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Printed material has the most robust constitutional guaran-
tees, giving publishers, writers, and booksellers the right to
safely disseminate almost anything without fear of govern-
ment interference or arrest. Radio and television stations, on
the other hand, live in a sticky regulatory web in which
licensees are expected to serve the public interest, and "com-
mon carriers" like telephone companies are obliged to serve
anyone who asks, with almost no limitations on content. 176
Today, whether expression by way of electronic media is protected depends
on both the content and the method of dissemination.77
Print enjoys "virtually absolute protection from government restric-
tion.', 17' The aim of the drafters of the Constitution was to guard against
any system of prior restraints, that is, the need to obtain government approv-
al prior to publication. The disfavor of prior restraints is reflected in the
history of the Supreme Court and lower courts. Even when imposed, such
restraints do not remain effective for long. 179
Broadcast media have been subject to the most stringent regulations. The
electromagnetic spectrum in which broadcasting operates arguably has a
limited physical capacity, therefore only a limited number of frequencies are
available for use. This rationale for regulating broadcast media is often re-
ferred to as "spectrum scarcity,"'80 and as a result, the Federal Communi-
176 Sussman, supra note 172, at 68.
177 See Note, supra note 5, at 1069.
178 Id. at 1071. For example, radio and television personality Howard Stern could
write whatever he wanted to in his book without fear of censorship or other governmen-
tal interference, but was fined by the FCC for saying similar things on the radio.
Sussman, supra note 172, at 68.
179 See, e.g., United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979),
dismissed, 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979), which enjoined the publication of an article
which described a method of manufacturing a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, the re-
straint was not ultimately successful-before the appeal could be heard, the government
dropped the case, because the controversial information subsequently had been printed
in other publications. United States v. Progressive, Inc., 610 F.2d 819 (7th Cir. 1979),
dismissing 467 F.Supp 990 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also New York Times Co. v. United
States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam), wherein the government sought to enjoin two
newspapers-the New York Times and the Washington Post-from publishing the so-
called "Pentagon Papers", a classified study entitled "History of the U.S. Decision-Mak-
ing Process on Vietnam Policy." Id. at 714. Before the case reached the Supreme Court,
the government successfully obtained a prior restraint against the New York Times.
United States v. New York Times, 444 F.2d 544 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
The Supreme Court reversed the prior restraint. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714.
18 See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (upholding
FCC "fairness doctrine" requiring broadcasters to grant individuals a right of reply, due
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cations Commission (FCC) is given the authority to license broadcasters. 8'
The other prevalent rationale for regulation is that the broadcast media en-
joys a uniquely pervasive presence in our lives. In other words, listeners and
viewers may not easily be able to avoid the broadcast.' Thus, as media
becomes more widespread and plays more of a part of our everyday lives,
the government is able to regulate it as a matter of public interest.'83
Telephones, or common carriers, are a different medium from broadcast
media. Telephones provide one-to-one interactive communication, rather
than one speaker or writer communicating to the multitudes.' Further-
more, the First Amendment protects callers' speech,'85 and the telephone
companies do not have the right to censor what is transmitted over the
lines.8 6
The problem of finding the "right" regulation for these new electronic
communications stems from the fact that they do not fit easily within the
three traditional classifications of media: print, broadcast, or common carri-
er. 7 The composition of text and distribution of files over a computer
network looks like printing and publishing, but because it is disseminated
over the network, it also looks like broadcasting. Also, one can have a one-
on-one "conversation" by sending e-mail back and forth, which resembles
the interactive element of telephone communications, especially when car-
to scarcity of broadcast frequencies).
18 Note, supra note 5, at 1064. Regulation is permitted because "broadcast channels
are a scarce public resource and that, in exchange for receiving the exclusive right to
exploit such a valuable public commodity, broadcasters should both expect and accept
regulation intended to insure that they operate in the public interest." Philip H. Miller,
Note, New Technology, Old Problem: Determining the First Amendment Status of Elec-
tronic Information Services, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 1147, 1150 (1993).
,8' See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (upholding FCC's ban on inde-
cent broadcast due to "uniquely pervasive presence" of broadcasting, and its accessi-
bility to children). The pervasiveness rationale attempts to address two concerns: first,
that an individual may be confronted with offensive, indecent material in his home,
where his privacy interests outweigh the "intruder's" First Amendment rights; and sec-
ond, that broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children, and broadcasters cannot trans-
mit material to adults without also reaching children. Note, supra note 5, at 1078.
183 For a more in depth discussion of frequency scarcity and pervasiveness, see Note,
supra note 5, 1070-81.
I d. at 1065.
18I Id. at 1086.
186 Miller, supra note 181, at 1160.
187 For a discussion of how electronic information services ought to be regulated, see
id. at 1192-1201. This is one area of the law that has some precedent, as a federal dis-
trict court ruled that an electronic information service, Compuserve, was more like a
distributor than a publisher of defamatory statements that appeared in one of its forums,
and therefore granted Compuserve's motion for summary judgment. Cubby, Inc. v.
Compuserve Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). For a detailed analysis of the
court's reasoning in Cubby, see Miller, supra note 181, at 1194-1201.
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ried over telephone lines. Electronic communications challenge media-de-
fined regulations because existing regulations regarding radio and television
broadcasting contemplate one-way transmissions, not interactive
technology.' The two rationales for regulating broadcast media simply do
not apply to electronic communications. There is no transmission over pub-
lic airwaves, so spectrum scarcity is not an issue.'89 Furthermore, electron-
ic communications do not have the same pervasiveness and captive audience
problems that broadcast media can have. As an example,
electronic information services [EIS] would seem to be
among the least intrusive of communications media, since
gaining access to an EIS requires the use of a considerable
amount of computer equipment, a 'dial up' initiated by the
user, and (at least for commercial services) the entering of an
individual password assigned to each user.9 °
Electronic communications are becoming increasingly common, but for now,
a good deal of computer equipment is necessary in order to receive such
communications. These facts militate against a finding of pervasiveness.
c. Identifying the "Speaker"
With electronic communications, not only is it hard to classify the medi-
um, but with so many aspects of the three traditional classifications blended
together, the roles of the people involved are also difficult to label. The
interactive element of computer networks merges roles that are at present
clearly delineated. The overlapping roles create a new problem of defining
who is the "speaker" for First Amendment purposes. Under traditional forms
of communication, the identity of the speaker was fairly obvious: it was the
person verbally speaking, writing, publishing, or broadcasting. Electronic
communications give rise to three possible speakers: network operators,
programmers/service providers, and users.'9 ' The simple idea of a "user" is
different from traditional individual speakers and writers:
Individuals will no longer simply be "viewers" or "receivers"
of the electronic media; they will become "users" of it, capa-
ble not only of creating their own video, voice, and text
188 Note, supra note 5, at 1082.
189 Miller, supra note 181, at 1191-92.
190 Id. at 1192.
191 For a discussion of how each of these potential speakers will function (compared
to current technology and similar roles), and how the First Amendment may be applied
to them, see Note, supra note 5, at 1084-88.
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messages, but also of communicating them to a large number
of others. The convergence of technologies will engender a
convergence of roles between system owners, programmers,
and users. The communications hierarchy will be replaced
with interactivity. 1
92
This interactivity available to the user also is the reason that the First
Amendment becomes so important. The user is more than simply a speaker;
he also has become in essence a writer and publisher. As his interests in
freedom logically increase, society also has a higher stake in keeping the
discourse free from restrictions. "Indeed, the ability to communicate interac-
tively with a large segment of the public through point-to-multipoint trans-
missions will reinforce users' First Amendment interests, in part because the
speech will contribute to public discourse rather than to a merely private
conversation.' ' 193 For purposes of First Amendment analysis of encryption,
this Note will focus on users as speakers, because they access electronic
communications and send messages. Furthermore, the message is encrypted
when sent, with the user deciding how to encrypt the message.
d. Content Categories
. Certain categories of speech receive little or no First Amendment protec-
tion, including obscenity,' defamation,'95 incitement of imminent law-
less behavior," and commercial speech.'97 These categories are consid-
192 Id. at 1083.
193 Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
194 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24-26 (1973) (setting the basic guide-
lines for determining what is "obscene" as judged by "contemporary community stan-
dards"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (finding no First Amendment pro-
tection for obscenity).
195 Defamation may or may not be defended on First Amendment grounds, depending
on who the target of the defamation is, and the subject matter discussed. See, e.g., Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (dealing with private figures); Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (dealing with public figures); New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (dealing with public officials and criticisms of
their official conduct).
19 See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that a state
cannot forbid advocacy of the use of force or law violation except when such advocacy
is directed toward inciting imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action).
" Commercial speech receives some First Amendment protection, but it is limited.
See, e.g., Posadas de P. R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (upholding ban
on casino advertising aimed at Puerto Rican residents); Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (recognizing commercial speech as
being entitled to lesser protection).
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ered to have "low" First Amendment value. With the growth of electronic
communications, categorizing information will become more difficult, while
punishment for communicating information in the unprotected categories
will be difficult, if not impossible.198 One example is obscenity. Possession
of obscene materials is permissible in the privacy of one's own home. 99
The electronic transfer of information makes obscenity even more readily
available to individuals at home.2°" Therefore, the traditional arguments
against obscenity such as accessibility by children, secondary effects on the
neighborhood, and offending the sensibilities of the general public no longer
apply.2"' Furthermore, defining something as obscene in light of contem-
porary community standards would be impossible in boundless
cyberspace."0 One cynical argument is that prosecutors will define the
standards by filing charges in the most conservative jurisdiction that
cyberspace reaches. 3
Thus, the argument progresses, content regulations will simply be re-
placed by time, place, or manner regulations, thereby allowing officials to
retain some measure of control." In that respect, First Amendment juris-
prudence related to electronic communications may change dramatically as
the dividing line between content-based and content-neutral regulations is
largely erased. Nevertheless, this Note assumes those distinctions remain.
e. Summary
Generally, electronic communications add more questions to the already
complex freedom of speech jurisprudence. The challenge will be to preserve
the utmost freedom for individuals while maintaining order and stability
198 See Katsh, supra note 13, at 1490-92 (arguing that prior restraint will become
impossible, and punishment after distribution will also be difficult).
199 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Cf id. Katsh, supra note 13, at 1473-75 (discussing how electronic transmission
of information has eliminated many of the constraints of previous forms of communica-
tion).
2o Note, supra note 5, at 1095.
202 For example, in July, 1994, a federal jury found a couple guilty of distributing
obscene material via a computer bulletin board system (BBS). The case was brought in
Memphis, Tennessee, even though the BBS operated in Milpitas, California, near San
Francisco; their convictions were affirmed on appeal. United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d
701 (6th Cir. 1996); see also Grosso, supra note 2, at 484. The case is controversial
because the "contemporary community standards" applied were that of Memphis, not
the remarkably different standards of Northern California. Grosso, supra note 2, at 484.
203 For an analysis of this issue, see Grosso, supra note 2, at 484 (questioning
"whether the most restrictive standard of the most conservative community is to become
the de facto standard for the entire country").
204 Katsh, supra note 13, at 1492. For another analysis on the future of content-based
regulations, see Note, supra note 5, at 1094-96.
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through this technological revolution. Recalling the foregoing definitional
complexities, the next section focuses on how mandatory encryption may
fare under traditional First Amendment free speech jurisprudence.
2. Content-Based Versus Content-Neutral Restrictions
When a government regulation on speech is challenged, the first inquiry
is to determine whether the regulation is content-based or content-neu-
tral.20 5 "The government's purpose is the controlling consideration in mak-
ing this decision."2' A regulation is content-based if the government
adopted it because the government disagrees with the message being con-
veyed2 7 or if it is aimed at the communicative impact of the speech-if it
restricts speech because of the specific message conveyed or because of the
effects that the speech produces.2 8 A content-based regulation is presumed
to violate the First Amendment and will be held unconstitutional unless the
government can show that the speech falls within one of the categories that
receive less protection.2" Accordingly, the court will decide whether the
speech has "low" First Amendment value, like obscenity and commercial
speech. If it does not, the speech is given virtually absolute protection ab-
sent time, place, or manner restrictions.210 Laws that are content-based and
do not have low First Amendment value generally trigger heightened scruti-
ny and are almost always struck down.21'
On the other hand, "[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the
content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect
on some speakers or messages but not others." '212 As defined by Laurence
Tribe, content-neutral regulations are aimed at the noncommunicative impact
of the speech.213 Their enforcement, however, has an adverse effect on
communicative opportunity."' With content-neutral regulations, courts
must balance the competing interests of government and the speaker, and
205 See SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.01[2][b].
206 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
207 Id. at 791.
208 LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 12-2, at 789-90 (2d ed.
1988).
209 Id. § 12-2, at 790-92. Examples of such categories are listed supra notes 194-97
and accompanying text.
210 See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969)
(holding that ban on wearing black armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War
was not a valid place restriction); TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-3, at 794-95; Geoffrey R.
Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 47-48 (1987).
211 See SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[1][a]; Stone, supra note 210, at 48.
212 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
213 TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-2, at 790.
214 Id.
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only uphold the regulation if it does not unduly constrict the flow of infor-
mation and ideas.215 Unlike content-based regulations, content-neutral regu-
lations are subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny, which more often
than not results in the regulation being upheld.216
3. Mandatory Encryption As a Content-Based Regulation
A mandatory encryption scheme facially seems to be content-neutral.
Under a mandatory encryption scheme, the government is not singling out
what is said, but rather is merely requiring that if a conversation is going to
be encrypted that it be done in a particular way. Encryption also does not
seem to fall within the realm of "expressive conduct." In Spence v. Wash-
ington,217 the Supreme Court found that the appellant had engaged in ex-
pressive conduct because "an intent to convey a particularized message was
present, and in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that
the message would be understood by those who viewed it. ' 218 With en-
cryption, neither of these elements are present. Accordingly, one could char-
acterize encryption as content-neutral because: (1) encryption is used to keep
communications private, not to send any particular message, and (2) the
only people who could "perceive" such a "message" would be those who
would intercept the encrypted text, which alone does not convey anything to
them.
Others, however, argue that in order to properly analyze whether manda-
tory encryption is content-based, one must focus on the encryption algorithm
or the encrypted message, and decide whether either can be considered
protectable speech. Accordingly, several commentators have suggested that
the encryption algorithm itself is either speech or written expression
protectable by the First Amendment. Kate Martin, Director of the American
Civil Liberties Union Center for National Security Studies, in addressing the
Computer Systems Security and Privacy Advisory Board, remarked that
"encryptic communications and encryption algorithms are a form of speech
protected by the First Amendment. 2 9 Similarly, John Perry Barlow, a
noted commentator on technology law, believes that "the encryption soft-
ware itself is written expression, upon which no ban may be constitutionally
imposed."22
215 Id. § 12-2, at 791.
216 SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[1][a], at 3-11.
217 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (appellant attached a peace symbol to the front and back of
his American flag and hung the flag upside down from his window).
218 Id. at 410-11 (emphasis added).
219 Commerce Advisory Board Faces Doubts About 'Clipper Chip' Initiative, Daily
Rep. for Executives (BNA), June 3, 1993, at A-11 (quoting Kate Martin, Director of the
ACLU Center for National Security Studies).
2 Barlow, supra note 155, at 24 (noting further that the constitutionality of export
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In any event, the courts may ultimately decide the issue. Several cases
have been filed challenging the export regulations of encryption, arguing in
part that the First Amendment protects the encryption algorithm. In February
1995, a lawsuit was filed in California by a mathematics graduate student
who wished to publish the encryption algorithm he developed, along with a
paper describing the algorithm and a computer program that runs the algo-
rithm.221 In part, the lawsuit challenges current export regulations as an
impermissible prior restraint on speech, and as a content-based regulation of
speech.222 Additionally, a San Diego software developer is challenging the
export regulations which allowed him to obtain an export license for a book
on cryptography, but not for a computer disk which contained the same
source code listed in the book.23 The plaintiff, Philip R. Karn, is alleging
that the export regulations relating to the disk violate free speech, act as a
prior restraint on speech, and chill the exercise of free speech.
Putting aside the protectability of the encryption algorithm, affording
First Amendment protection for an encrypted message may call for a new
understanding of what is meant by "expression." Considering the problems
electronic communications already pose for other areas of First Amendment
analysis, perhaps such a redefinition is necessary. A new idea of expression
would have to define precisely "messages," and what constitutes the "con-
tent" of electronic communications.
The question is whether the protectable message is the plaintext or
cyphertext. Anyone can understand plaintext, but cyphertext is the particular
bit pattern that results when the communication is sent; that is, the actual
arrangement of ones and zeroes that the computer reads. Those who support
protecting cyphertext argue that "[t]he process of encryption changes the
original message into a coded one by use of an encryption algorithm....
Regardless of the method, an encrypted message is a mathematical transla-
tion of the original. As a form of communication, it should be considered
speech under the First Amendment."2" Considering cyphertext alone as
restrictions simply had not been challenged). There is speculation that government offi-
cials dropped their investigation of Phil Zimmerman because they were unwilling to
undertake a case that might potentially scrutinize the application of export laws to cryp-
tography. See Abrahms, supra note 54, at 36.
22 Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, No. C95-0582-MHP (N.D. Cal. filed
Feb. 21, 1995); see also Peter Cassidy, Cryptography Suit Seeks Definition, COMPUTER
WORLD, Mar. 27, 1995, at 73.
2 The full text of Bernstein's complaint is available online at http:
//www.eff.org/pub/Alert/effbernstein_950221 .complaint.
Karn v. United States Dep't of State, No. 95-CV-01812 (D.D.C. filed Sept. 21,
1995); see also Crypto Speech Case Heating Up, INFORMATION LAW ALERT: A
VOORHEES REPORT, Dec. 9, 1994. The full text of Karn's complaint can be found
online -at http://www.qualcomm.com/people/pkarn/export/complaint.html.
22 King, supra note 153, at 255.
1202 [Vol. 4:3
GOVERNMENT-CONTROLLED ENCRYPTION
the message would render the idea of a content-based regulation completely
unworkable. Defining each cyphertext as a different message from the un-
derlying plaintext is the same as saying "der Kater ist weiss," "koshka
byela," "le chat est blanc," and "WKHFDWLVZKLWE" are different mes-
sages, when they all translate into English as "the cat is white."2' Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, in all five cases the "content" would be the differ-
ent words used and their spelling instead of the actual meaning of the sen-
tence.
Under Tribe's definition, a regulation is content-based if it is aimed at
the communicative impact of the speech-the message being conveyed or
the effects that the speech produces.226 Under this definition, mandatory
encryption may be considered content-based, depending upon the
government's rationale and the classification of the harm that the govern-
ment is trying to prevent. For example, if the government is trying to guar-
antee the ability to wiretap effectively, then the regulation appears content-
neutral. If, however, the harm to be avoided is criminal solicitation and
conspiracy, then the harm is inherent in the communication itself and the
regulation appears to be content-based, masked as content-neutral. Under
this latter analysis, regardless of how the restriction is applied, it is enacted
because of what is being said and the reason for which the transmission
lines are being used.227 The government is afraid that it will not be able to
listen to what people might be saying or planning. Encryption itself does not
threaten national security or safety; it is the activity being planned out of the
government's sight or hearing that is the threat.
If mandatory encryption is found to be content-based, then a regulation
implementing mandatory encryption would have to survive Strict scrutiny by
the courts. To withstand such scrutiny, the government would have to show
that the regulation serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end.2" In all likelihood, however, most courts would not
engage in the mental gymnastics necessary to find a content-based restric-
tion when the more logical option of finding a content-neutral restriction is
Under this analysis, the English version would constitute a fifth message. The
phrases listed are German, Russian, French, and Caesar cipher, respectively. The Cae-
sar cipher "substitutes every letter in a message with the letter that is three letters high-
er-A becomes D, B becomes E, and so on." Prosise, supra note 12, at 315.
' TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-2, at 789-90.
2 See Greiveldinger, supra note 83, at 505-06 (discussing drug trafficking and-white
collar crime).
See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981). Whether the state interest
would be compelling closely follows the content-neutral "time, place, or manner" anal-
ysis. See infra notes 239-305 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested
that mandatory key escrow could be viewed as compelled speech, and would be ana-
lyzed under this same strict scrutiny. See Froomkin, supra note 153, at 812-15.
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available. Thus, mandatory encryption as a content-neutral regulation is
analyzed in more detail.
4. Mandatory Encryption As a Content-Neutral Regulation
Apart from the issue of the reason that the government is listening,
mandatory encryption more comfortably fits within the content-neutral clas-
sification. A regulation is content-neutral if it is justified "'without reference
to the content of the regulated speech."'229 Nevertheless, content-neutral
regulations are not automatically upheld by the courts, regardless of the
reasons they were passed, because their effect is to reduce the total quantity
of speech circulating in society.23° "Overt censorship of disfavored view-
points is not the only means of silencing speech; the free flow of informa-
tion can be reduced by non-content regulation as well."23'
Under mandatory encryption the government would not pick and choose
who can and who cannot use encryption, or define what subject matter
could be encrypted using a particular encryption scheme. Mandatory encryp-
tion instead would proscribe a particular means of communication. The
government has recognized the need for strong encryption, and therefore
would not ban it outright. Instead, a mandatory encryption scheme would
allow encryption only under certain conditions, thereby denying citizens a
completely private means of communication. Because mandatory encryption
would most likely be considered content-neutral, the court would likely only
use intermediate scrutiny.232 Nevertheless, there are several ways in which
the courts may evaluate mandatory encryption's constitutionality.
a. Incidental Impact Regulations
The first type of content-neutral regulations are those restricting "sym-
bolic expression," also referred to as "incidental impact" regulations. Al-
though these laws are not passed to regulate the content of the speech, they
still incidentally affect speech.233 When the government attempts to regu-
late conduct that contains both "speech" and "nonspeech" elements, the
regulation will be upheld if it can meet the four-part test set out in United
States v. O'Brien:
22
229 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
230 SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[1], at 3-12.
231 Id.
22 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government have only a "significant" or
"substantial" interest in regulating speech. See id. § 3.02[3][A], at 3-36 to 3-37.
13 See id. § 3.02 [4][a], at 3-50.
234 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.235
These laws regulate conduct, but they also have an incidental impact on
speech because the conduct sought to be restricted conveys a message, or at
least is capable of conveying a message. For example, burning draft cards or
the American flag is conduct, but that conduct also conveys a message of
protest. Therefore, the Supreme Court analyzed laws prohibiting such types
of conduct as incidental impact regulations.236
Mandatory encryption does not appear to fit the definition of an inciden-
tal impact regulation, where representative cases have dealt with conduct
capable of conveying a message.237 Encryption is definitely conduct, but to
say that the act of encrypting conveys a message requires quite a stretch in
logic.238 A court probably would be disinclined to follow such logic, given
the easier analytical fit of mandatory encryption as a time, place, or manner
regulation.
23- Id. at 377.
26 For example, the Court in O'Brien upheld the defendant's conviction for burning
his draft card, even though he did so to protest the Vietnam War, finding a substantial
and legitimate government interest in preventing the destruction of draft cards. Id. at
378-80. By contrast, the Court has twice struck down laws against flag desecration,
finding that the laws banning such desecration were not designed to further an impor-
tant governmental interest. Instead, the Court found that the laws were passed because
of a disagreement with the speaker's message, which was conveyed by burning the
nation's symbol. See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 314 (1990); Texas v.
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-10 (1989).
"' See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (holding that New York
City's sound amplification guidelines for music programs in Central Park were valid as
a reasonable regulation of the place and manner of expression); see also Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (holding that sleeping in public
parks to dramatize the plight of the homeless was expressive conduct); Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that wearing black
armbands to school in protest of the Vietnam War seen as nearly "pure speech").
238 See discussion supra part III.B.3.
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b. Time, Place, or Manner Regulations
The most common type of content-neutral restriction is a time, place, or
manner regulation."' With these types of regulations, the government is not
concerned with what was said, but rather when, where, or how loudly some-
thing was expressed.40 Mandatory encryption fits easily within this de-
scription. One useful analogy may be that encrypting communications is like
speaking in a language the government cannot understand or translate. 4
Thus, the government is proscribing a certain language or manner of speech.
The location, or forum, in which the speech takes place is an important
factor in undertaking a time, place, or manner analysis. The Supreme Court
has defined three different categories of forums:
(1) "traditional" public forums, such as parks, which have
historically been dedicated to assembly and debate; (2) "des-
ignated" public forums, consisting of public property which
the government has opened for use by the public as a place
for expressive activity; and (3) "nonforums," places which
have not by either tradition or designation been used for
indiscriminate expressive activity.242
The forum in which the speech takes place determines how much speech
regulation the government can employ: the more open and public the forum,
the stricter the standards the government must meet. 3
For the purposes of forum analysis, computer networks are functionally
very similar to traditional public forums, in that some computer networks
were specifically designed for interactive communication and exchange of
ideas on a massive scale.244 Several differences exist, however, which
239 See SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[3][a], at 3-32.
24 Id.
"' See King, supra note 153, at 255. "Self styled 'cypherpunks' argue that the gov-
ernment has no more right to insist on a back door in secure telephones than it does to
restrict the language or vocabulary used in telephone conversations on the grounds that
dialect might hinder interpretation of wiretaps." Paul Wallich, Clipper Runs Aground,
Sci. AM., Aug. 1993, at 116, 116. As John Perry Barlow explains: "Whole languages
(most of them patois) have arisen on this planet for the purpose of making the speaker
unintelligible to authority. I know of no instance where, even in the oppressive colonies
where such languages were formed, slave-owners banned their use." Barlow, supra note
155, at 24.
2 See SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[3][c], at 3-40.
23 See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47, at
1145-48 (5th ed. 1995); SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 10.02[1][a]-[c].
24 See Grosso, supra note 2, at 481-82.
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make the comparison less than perfect. For example, in a computer network,
the "speakers" can remain anonymous, out of public view, and can choose
how few or many receive their communication. Also, the public does not yet
have free access to cyberspace, considering the amount of equipment and
cost that may be necessary to access the networks. On the other hand, net-
works are not controlled by thegovernment and therefore cannot be consid-
ered designated public forums. In addition, because their sole function is to
facilitate expressive activity, networks cannot be considered nonforums.
Logically then, networks are the functional equivalent of the open-air mar-
ket, with the added feature that this market spans the entire globe. The gov-
ernment can employ a time, place, or manner restriction in a traditional
public forum as long as it "promotes an important interest unrelated to the
suppression of a particular message and does not unnecessarily restrict the
ability to communicate the message.""
The Supreme Court has adopted a three-part test to determine whether a
time, place, or manner regulation is constitutional. Government may impose
restrictions on speech if they "'are justified without reference to the content
of the regulated speech, [if] they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant
governmental interest, and [if] they leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information. ' The party challenging the regu-
lation has the initial burden of showing that the regulation impinges on
speech. Once that threshold showing is met, which would likely be simple
in the case of mandatory encryption, the burden lies with the government to
show that the regulation satisfies all three parts of the test.7
As previously noted, because mandatory encryption is more accurately
described as content-neutral rather than content-based,248 it easily meets
the first prong. The second and third prongs provide more of an analytical
challenge.
1. "Narrowly Tailored"
With respect to the first half of the second prong, the Supreme Court in
Ward v. Rock Against Racism249 reaffirmed that the regulation need not be
the least restrictive means available in order to be narrowly tailored." In
fact, the Court noted that the requirement would be satisfied if the "regula-
245 See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 243, § 16.47, at 1093; SMOLLA, supra note
173, § 10.02[a][i]-[iii], at 10-21 to 10-22.
26 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 481 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (quoting Clark v. Com-
munity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984)).
247 SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[3][d], at 3-50.
248 See discussion supra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
9 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Id. at 798 (emphasis added).
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tion promote[d] a substantial government interest that would be achieved
less effectively absent the regulation."" 1 Therefore, the Court will not auto-
matically invalidate a regulation just because alternatives exist, but the
means chosen must not be substantially broader than necessary to achieve
the government's interest. 5 2
Without an actual regulation, it is obviously difficult to predict whether
mandatory encryption would be narrowly tailored. Whether a regulation
would be upheld depends on the exact speech limits imposed and the
regulation's impact on users. The crucial focal point becomes what a court
would view as most important to the user. If the focus is on the ability to
choose among different encryption methods, then mandating one particular
encryption scheme for all users of electronic communications can hardly be
considered narrow. Different encryption methods are used for different pur-
poses. Therefore, mandating one particular method could impair the ability
to encrypt effectively. Mandating key escrow generally, which allows a
choice of encryption but which requires that the key be made available to
the government should they need it, seems less narrow. An even less restric-
tive regulation would require escrow of keys of a certain bit length or more,
mirroring the government's recent proposal for export decontrol. Under an
escrow scheme, however, one would arguably have more choices among
encryption methods. The restriction would therefore be narrowly tailored, as
long as the industry provides choices. If the government tried to force a de
facto standard again, as it did with EES, then the users' choice would be
illusory.5 '3 There would be no choice of mandatory encryption that al-
lowed a completely private conversation. 4 If the focus is on the users'
right to speak privately, then any scheme providing instant access to the
government cannot be narrowly tailored.
"1 Id. at 799 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)) (empha-
sis added).
252 Id. at 800.
" Mike Godwin, online counsel for the Electronic Frontier Foundation, made this
very argument against EES:
Freedom of choice is meaningful only if there are real choices. The government's
export strategy is designed to make sure that there aren't any choices. If commer-
cial software companies aren't allowed to sell encryption to the world market,
they're unlikely to develop strong, easy-to-use alternatives to the Clipper. And
that means individuals won't have access to alternatives.
Mike Godwin, A Chip over My Shoulder: The Problems with Clipper, INTERNET
WORLD, July/Aug. 1994, at 92, 93.
4 This is true even with the last alternative, because one can assume that the gov-
ernment would set the key length in accordance with what the NSA believes it could
crack reasonably quickly.
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2. "Significant Governmental Interest"
As with any content-neutral regulation, two competing interests are
balanced: the extent to which communicative activity is inhibited, and the
values, interests, or rights that will be served by enforcing the regula-
tion." Not only must a time, place, or manner regulation be narrowly tai-
lored, it must also serve a significant governmental interest. 1 6 Some com-
mentators equate "significant interest" with "important" or "substantial inter-
est," which is lower than the "compelling interest" that the government must
show to justify a content-based regulation.67
The government's rationale for a mandatory encryption scheme would
be the same as was proposed for the adoption of EES.25 Its concern is,
once again, law enforcement's ability to understand what has been intercept-
ed by a wiretap, and the NSA's ability to conduct signals intelligence. On
the surface, the issue seems moot: after all, if the Court considers "ensuring
the sufficiency of sound amplification at bandshell events" to be substan-
tial, 9 surely wiretapping and signals intelligence would count as substan-
tial. Other governmental interests that the Court has found substantial in
upholding regulations include maintaining the condition of public parks,26
avoiding distractions to traffic and protecting the quiet and tranquility of a
municipality,"' and preventing visual blight. 62 Although these seem rel-
atively minor in comparison to the potential harm imposed by unfettered
encryption, in those cases the "harm" actually existed. The government's
rationales for mandatory encryption are serious, but at this point merely
speculative.
The ability to wiretap is important to law enforcement, but encryption
does not prevent wiretapping; it only makes the intercepted communication
unintelligible. The government advocated EES in combination with its Digi-
tal Telephony Bill, which sought to have telephone companies modify their
systems in order to make wiretapping easier.63 The Telephony Bill, how-
ever, was a response to improved communications technology that actually
TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-23, at 979.
256 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
257 SMOLLA, supra note 173, § 3.02[3][A].
See supra part I.D.
'9 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796-97 (1989).
260 Clark, 468 U.S. at 288 (banning sleeping in public parks as a means to draw
attention to plight of the homeless).
" Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (banning vehicle amplification devices that
emit loud and raucous noises).
262 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984)
(upholding ban against posting signs on utility poles).
263 See supra note 57.
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prevented agencies from being able to adequately wiretap phone lines.2
To date, there has been no harm to wiretapping from encryption: "the FBI
has not been able to point to a single case to date where encryption has
hampered their investigation of a case."
265
Furthermore, serious questions have arisen as to the feasibility of wire-
tapping.266 As James Kallstrom stated before the House Subcommittee, on-
ly 919 criminal wiretaps were authorized in 1992." 7 In 1993, 976 wiretaps
were authorized, seventeen of which were never installed."8 By way of
comparison, in 1991 there were "approximately one-half trillion phone calls
and over 140 million installed phone lines."29 Thus, the percentage of
wiretapped calls in relation to the total number of calls placed is very
small. 70 Furthermore, only a few thousand people are arrested each year
after wiretap investigations,2 71 compared to 14 million overall arrests in
1991.272 Of the 976 wiretaps authorized in 1993, seventy-three percent
were in three states: New York, New Jersey, and Florida.273 Also in 1993,
nine states forbade the police to use wiretaps, and twenty-nine other states
did not use them.274 Finally, roughly seventy percent of wiretaps are used
for narcotics offenses, and ten percent for gambling investigations.275
These are the so-called "victimless crimes" and not the ones the law en-
forcement agencies usually tout as their justification for needing wiretaps.
The FBI usually justifies the need for controlling encryption by arguing that
encryption could render authorities unable to solve or prevent such heinous
crimes as murder or kidnapping.276 This could be a powerfully persuasive
argument to the public, even more so now that such threats no longer seem
264 Because of the digitalization of information, law enforcement agencies are not
always able to intercept a complete conversation. See discussion supra notes 57-58 and
accompanying text.
26 Hoffman et al., supra note 34, at 115.
266 Robin Hanson, Can Wiretaps Remain Cost-Effective?, COMM. ACM, Dec. 1994,
at 13.
267 Hearing, supra note 34, at 16 (statement of James K. Kalistrom, Deputy Director
of the U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology).
26' Hanson, supra note 266, at 14.
269 Banisar, supra note 32, at 501.
270 Id.
271 One statistical analysis puts the number of convictions at 7324 from 1985 to 1991.
Hanson, supra note 266, at 14. These numbers do not reflect monetary fines and pre-
vented economic loss.
272 Banisar, supra note 32, at 501.
273 Hanson, supra note 266, at 15.
274 Id.
275 Id. at 14. The actual percentage of wiretaps used for narcotics offenses in 1992
was 69%.
276 Banisar, supra note 32, at 501; see also discussion supra notes 59-60 and accom-
panying text.
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so far away. Using the threat of terrorism as justification, many Americans
cannot help but recall the devastating images of the World Trade Center
bombing and the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City. In real-
ity, these types of crimes are rarely solved by wiretapping. In 1992, wiretaps
were used three times in kidnapping investigations, and thirty-five times in
murder investigations.2' Moreover, some argue that wiretaps rarely pre-
vent crimes, but are instead most often used after the crime has already been
committed, to gather evidence about suspects.27 Therefore, although wire-
tapping may assist law enforcement agencies in some investigations, the
emergency situation the FBI and other law enforcement agencies cite is a
very rare occurrence. 279
Wiretapping may or may not be useful or feasible on a widespread
scale. Nevertheless, because wiretapping's usefulness or feasibility is ques-
tionable-coupled with the fact that no harm has occurred to wiretapping
from encryption-makes the government's case for mandatory encryption
unconvincing. The feasibility of a wiretap also depends on the need for
evidence, and whether it could be obtained by other means. Even in emer-
gency situations, government agents will find out when they intercept the
communication that it is encrypted. The need for real time decryption may
be very great, but it is unclear whether any safeguards the government may
institute, as was done with EES,2s will allow for decryption in time to ac-
tually prevent a crime. The other, broader philosophical argument is that law
enforcement officials should not be treating wiretapping as an "entitlement,"
and that privacy is too important to be set aside "just in case."'" There
may be an attitude on the part of law enforcement that they have a "right"
to wiretap, and that technology should be accessible to them if and when the
need to wiretap arises. As others have argued, government may conduct
reasonable searches, but it is not entitled to an effective search. 2
Due to the secrecy of the NSA's operations, fully evaluating their con-
cerns for national security is difficult; however, the national security threat
can be examined on a broader policy level. First, while the NSA is con-
cerned about conducting signals intelligence within foreign nations, a man-
datory encryption scheme is domestic in nature. The type and strength of
encryption used by the rest of the world cannot be directly controlled by the
United States. The NSA was prominent in the development of cryptography,
and the United States as a whole is a leader in the field. Accordingly, the
NSA understandably wants to use export controls to keep that technology
2" Banisar, supra note 32, at 501.
"7 Godwin, supra note 253, at 94.
279 Id.
28 See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
2' Brody, supra note 10, at 27.
2 See Froomkin, supra note 153, at 826-27.
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from spreading outside U.S. borders. The fact remains, however, that DES-
based products are already available worldwide, as are PGP, RSA, and 150
or so other products with DES-strength encryption.8 To use a well-worn
phrase, it looks as though the genie is out of the bottle.
Once the government's interests are examined, it is not easy to classify
those interests as significant. So far encryption has done no harm domesti-
cally, and the United States is unable to control what happens outside its
borders. Thus, the threat may not be as great as it seems, either because the
technology will not be misused on the scale feared, or because the technolo-
gy will not be used at all. For example, technology may have been success-
ful in thwarting some terrorists, but
[t]he danger for counterterrorists is in thinking that an array
of fancy surveillance gear provides all the answers. Terrorists
have found an easy and cheap way to evade the cops: go
low-tech-or no-tech. They communicate not over the
Internet but face to face; for destruction, they use a detonator
that has so far proven unstoppable-a bomb-laden zealot. 84
The government does not necessarily have to wait until disaster strikes, but
it is important to weigh the interests of users against speculative harm, and
not to overregulate blindly.
3. "Open Ample Alternatives for Communication"
The third prong of the Court's test provides the other side of the bal-
ance: whether the regulation leaves open ample alternatives for communica-
tion. 85 The crucial question will be deciding precisely what is considered
an "alternative" to encrypted communications: some other means of confi-
dential communications or non-encrypted communications.
The ability to communicate in confidence will be severely curtailed, if
not lost altogether, if the government mandates either a particular encryption
method or only key escrow. Arguably, one could find alternative private
channels of communication in the form of face-to-face contact or in letter
283 See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
284 Tom Masland et al., Terrorism: A Battle on High-And Low, NEWSWEEK, Feb.
27, 1995, at 40, 40.
28. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting advertisements of
prescription drug prices); see TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-23, at 978-79.
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writing. 16 The same argument was proposed against the Digital Telephony
Bill:
Telegrams, letters, or personal contact seem to be the main
communication alternatives available to ensure similar confi-
dentiality. Requiring personal contact, however, discriminates
against those who cannot afford to travel, and neither tele-
grams nor letters provide instantaneous communication like
telephone calls or e-mail." 7
Although these methods may be private, they do not have the speed, versa-
tility, or the ability to go beyond physical boundaries that electronic commu-
nications can offer. Comparing the advantages that electronic communica-
tions present, it is difficult to imagine that either clandestine face-to-face
contact or the Postal Service qualify as true "alternatives" to encrypted com-
munications.
Many cases have gone before the Supreme Court when a certain means
of communication has been foreclosed.2"8 Means of communication that
have been previously targeted include leafletting,289 door-to-door solicita-
tion,"' public solicitation,"' sound trucks,292  live entertainment,"'
street demonstrations,294  billboards,295  and signs on public utility
poles.296 These types of prohibitions have been found constitutional be-
cause the speaker has an alternative means of expression available.2 7 The
rationale behind the discussions is that elimination of any particular means
of expression probably does not significantly reduce the total quantity of,
and opportunities for, free expression.298 Nevertheless, "[a]lthough prohi-
bitions foreclosing entire media may be completely free of content or view-
26 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516 (1981); see, e.g.,
Scheurer, supra note 153, at 284 (noting that "it may be argued that alternative channels
for transmitting highly confidential information are available through the use of the
mail").
" Nelson, supra note 57, at 1164.
288 See Stone, supra note 210, at 64-67. The following cases are what he described as
"the prohibited media cases." Id. at 64.
289 Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
290 Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
291 Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
292 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
293 Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61 (1981).
294 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
295 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
296 Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
297 Stone, supra note 210, at 64-65.
298 Id.
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point discrimination, the danger they pose to the freedom of speech is readi-
ly apparent-by eliminating a common means of speaking, such measures
can suppress too much speech." '299
According to Tribe, one factor that weighs in the balance is the degree
to which such a regulation "falls unevenly upon various groups in the soci-
ety." 3" This factor arguably played a large role in the Court's decision in
City of Ladue v. Gilleo,30' in which the Court struck down a ban on resi-
dential signs, noting that they are "an unusually cheap and convenient form
of communication. Especially for persons of modest means or limited mobil-
ity, a yard or window sign may have no practical substitute.""3 2 In analyz-
ing a mandatory key escrow scheme, Professor Froomkin argues that the
impact would fall unevenly on those with access to such devices-a group
that differs greatly from those the Court traditionally protects the most: the
poor and those that are without access to alternative means of communica-
tion. 3 Given the growth of electronic communications over the past sev-
eral years, and the fact that forecasters predict that almost everything will be
done electronically-including banking and shopping-such a regulation
potentially impacts a majority of the population of the United States. The
key to deciding the weight of the government's interest in restricting encryp-
tion will be the importance with which a court views the confidentiality of
the message to be, and whether encryption would inhibit free expres-
sion."
In addition to personal contact and regular mail, another alternative to
encrypted communications is the use of non-encrypted communications. 3"
The benefits of electronic communications-speed and the number of poten-
tial listeners-remain intact, and mandatory encryption still provides some
security. Requiring keys to be escrowed or using only government-approved
encryption means that the communication would not be completely confi-
dential, and thus may not be a "true" alternative to communications encrypt-
ed by the user's choice of method. Many encryption methods can arguably
be deciphered by the cryptography experts at NSA, but there is a significant
difference to the user between someone "cracking" their encryption code
and handing over the keys ahead of time. The argument that some security
299 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114 S. Ct. 2038, 2045 (1994).
" TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-23, at 979.
301 114 S. Ct. 2038 (1994).
32 Id. at 2046.
303 Froomkin, supra note 153, at 816.
3' Froomkin finds that this inhibition would be fairly minor, given that the keys
would only be released for just cause. Id. at 816-17. For a more detailed evaluation of
the possible chilling effect of mandatory encryption, see discussion infra part III.B.5.
305 The term "non-encrypted communications" refers to electronic communications
that cannot be encrypted with the user's choice of encryption method, as would result
under a mandatory encryption scheme.
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insured by the government is better than no security minimizes both the
importance of having a completely confidential means of communication
and the chilling effect on speech that may occur if there is no longer such
privacy.
5. Possible Chilling Effect of Mandatory Encryption
a. Traditional Chilling Effect Analysis
Beyond the doctrinal examination, into the implications of mandatory
encryption, there lurks a broader, more philosophical inquiry as to the ef-
fects of such a policy on free speech. With no empirical studies to analyze,
the question of whether the absence of a completely confidential means of
communication will "chill" speech is purely hypothetical.3 6 Although no
definitive answer can be given, after examining the traditional arguments for
finding a chilling effect, this section will outline the factors that must be
taken into account before deciding whether a mandatory encryption scheme
would chill speech-and perhaps before the entire constitutionality question
may be answered.
A "chilling effect" occurs when people are deterred from participating in
a particular activity."' In the area of First Amendment free speech, the no-
tion of a chilling effect takes on a more sinister tone-self-censorship--as
people are deterred from expressing themselves as they otherwise might.3"
This self-censorship arises out of fear of punishment-a fear that arises
because the legal process is riddled with uncertainty, and individuals are
afraid that what they may say is too close to the line.3" Tribe explains this
phenomenon in the context of defamation law as "a great danger...
aris[ing] from the fear of guessing wrong-the fear that the trier of fact,
3 Professor Froomkin has advocated that speech would be chilled by a mandatory
encryption scheme, but admits that it would be difficult to collect evidence on the sub-
ject. Froomkin, supra note 153, at 815-16 & n.452.
'" Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling
Effect", 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 689 (1978).
308 Id. at 690-92. This is to be contrasted with the general notion of a chilling effect
as a deterrent, which has neither a negative nor a positive connotation, as many laws,
especially criminal laws, are specifically designed to proscribe-"chill"--certain unde-
sirable activity. See id. at 689-90. In the First Amendment context, Schauer defines
chilling effect as occurring "when individuals seeking to engage in activity protected by
the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from so doing by governmental regulation not
specifically directed at that protected activity." Id. at 693.
" See id. at 694-701. As the Supreme Court has noted, "where particular speech
falls close to the line separating the lawful and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken
factfinding-inherent in all litigation-will create the danger that the legitimate utter-
ance will be penalized." Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
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proceeding by formal processes of proof and refutation, will after the event
reject the individual's judgment of truth. 31°
As a result of this uncertainty, individuals "restrict[] their conduct to that
which is unquestionably safe., 311 Such self-censorship does not occur only
after being charged, for "[t]he threat of sanctions may deter [the exercise of
First Amendment freedoms] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions. '31 ' Furthermore, the likely outcome of any prosecution does not
necessarily relieve the speaker. "The chilling effect upon the exercise of
First Amendment rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaf-
fected by the prospects of its success or failure., 313 Self-censorship is es-
pecially common where the individual, rather than the government, would
bear the burden of proof at trial, for "[t]he man who knows that he must
bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his conduct
necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if the State must
bear these burdens., 314
The consequence of self-censorship is that freedom of speech is not
fully exercised and society ultimately bears the loss. 315 "The danger of this
sort of invidious chilling effect lies in the fact that something that 'ought' to
be expressed is not. Deterred by the fear of punishment, some individuals
refrain from saying or publishing that which they lawfully could, and in-
deed, should., 316 Simply put, where the line is gray-as much of the First
Amendment is-individuals may not expend the time and energy to calcu-
late where exactly the line is; instead they will either restrict their speech to
that which is safe, or say nothing at all.
The application of the chilling effect doctrine is most readily seen in
cases which define the line between protected and unprotected speech: defa-
mation, 317 obscenity, 38 and incitement or advocacy of imminent lawless-
310 TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-12, at 863-64.
311 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 372 (1964).
312 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1961) (emphasis added).
313 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (emphasis added).
314 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
311 Schauer, supra note 307, at 693.
316 Id.
317 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (prohibiting
"a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his
official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not"); see also Schauer, supra note 307, at 705-14.
318 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting the basic guidelines
for defining obscenity as "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary com-
munity standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the
work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value"); see
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ness.1 9 With each example, the Court has struggled to define exactly what
kind of speech falls into each category, in an effort to provide some guid-
ance as to what is constitutionally protected speech, and arguably to reduce
any chilling effect. Apart from content categories of speech, particular regu-
lations which allegedly chill speech can be challenged on either over-
breadth32 or vagueness32' grounds. According to Tribe, both of these
doctrines represent the notion that "in close cases, government must leave
speech ample room to breathe. '322 Frederick Schauer goes a step further,
advocating that the First Amendment is the preferred value, and therefore,
realizing that errors will be made in the judicial process, the chilling effect
doctrine states that rules and procedures should be designed to err on the
side of free speech.323
b. Factors in Deciding Whether Mandatory Encryption Would Chill Speech
The foregoing analysis presupposes that we are dealing with a problem
of defining whether speech is in a protected or unprotected category, or that
a specific regulation affecting the exercise of free speech is at issue. Analyz-
ing the possible chilling effect caused by a mandatory encryption scheme
does not fit into either "traditional" usage of the argument. Instead, we are
also Schauer, supra note 307, at 714-21.
"' See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that the consti-
tutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or pro-
duce such action); see also Schauer, supra note 307, at 721-25.
" A law is overbroad if "it 'does not aim specifically at evils within the allowable
area of [government] control, but ... sweeps within its ambit other activities that con-
stitute an exercise' of protected expressive or associational rights." TRIBE, supra note
208, § 12-27, at 1022 (alteration in original) (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97 (1940)). The danger lies in the fact that "an 'overbroad' law ... 'hangs over
[people's] heads like a Sword of Damocles.' That judges will ultimately rescue those
whose conduct in retrospect is held protected is not enough, 'for the value of a Sword
of Damocles is that it hangs-not that it drops."' TRIBE, supra note 208, § 12-27, at
1023 (citation omitted) (quoting Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 231 (1974) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting)).
321 Tribe explains that:
[a]s a matter of due process, a law is void on its face if it so vague that persons
"of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application." Such vagueness occurs when a legislature states its proscriptions in
terms so indefinite that the line between innocent and condemned conduct be-
comes a matter of guesswork.
Id. § 12-31, at 1033 (citation omitted) (quoting Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269
U.S. 385, 391 (1926)).
3- Id. § 12-33, at 1039.
31 Schauer, supra note 307, at 732.
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left with a much broader philosophical inquiry-would speech be chilled
due to the lack of confidentiality of electronic communications? Stated dif-
ferently, would knowing that the government had the means to decrypt their
electronic communications cause individuals to refrain from using the medi-
um; alternatively, would they be deterred from speaking freely, from debat-
ing or criticizing policies or positions, or from advocating unpopular opin-
ions?
This question can only be answered on an individual level, and only
after considering a number of factors. Yet this imprecision is not a fatal
flaw in chilling effect analysis, for admittedly all chilling arguments are
based on what the likely effect would be on individuals, without conclusive,
or perhaps any, proof of that effect. As Schauer states:
While the chilling effect concept appears to be premised on
predictions or assumptions about human behavior, no evi-
dence has been proffered to justify those predictions. It has
not been clearly established that individuals are mistakenly
deterred or become overly cautious as a result of the exis-
tence of particular statutes, rules or regulations. Yet it surely
is not to be expected that courts will always abstain from
making or accepting assumptions about human behavior;
behavior is, after all, that with which the law is fundamental-
ly concerned.324
Although there is no definitive way to tell whether speech would be chilled,
this Note will identify certain factors which should be considered in weigh-
ing any possible chilling effect.
The first factor to be examined is the exact scope of authority that the
government would have in obtaining cryptographic keys. If no safeguard is
provided, and the government is allowed to freely monitor transmissions,
then a chilling effect argument seems very viable. In fact, it is difficult to
imagine that there would not be a chilling effect, given basic knowledge
about human behavior-that individuals behave differently when they be-
lieve they are being observed.3" Some common examples include the rush
to "look busy" when a supervisor enters the office or work area; the differ-
ence between what we discuss with others as opposed to what we write in
324 Id. at 730.
31 A current example of this phenomenon is the seemingly exponential increase in
the number of video cameras around us. The fear is that "as security cameras and ama-
teur camcorders multiply around us, our zone of privacy shrinks. All those lenses aimed
at us inflict a chilling effect on everyday behavior." Bill Stamets, Camcorders: When Is
Recording a Protected Right, and When Is It an Invasion of Privacy?, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Mar. 4, 1994, at 54.
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diaries; and the difference in tone and content of a telephone conversation
when one is calling from a private office as opposed to a crowded room. A
mandatory encryption scheme is unlikely to give the government blanket
authority to monitor electronic transmissions. Instead, government agents
probably would be required to. obtain a search warrant before they could
obtain any keys. The question remains whether a warrant-type safeguard
would result in complete "confidentiality" in the users' minds, and whether
it would chill speech.
These questions ultimately relate to the perception of confidentiality
under a mandatory encryption scheme. A comparison to other technologies
illustrates the connection. For example, both cellular and cordless phones
are notorious for their lack of security. Cellular phones are vulnerable to
eavesdropping through radio scanners, and illegal use of their networks
costs cellular carriers an estimated $500 million per year.3' Similarly,
cordless phone transmissions are easily intercepted by other cordless phones,
radio scanners, and even baby monitors.327 In fact, cordless phone custom-
ers are often advised to not say anything that "they wouldn't want to see on
the front page of their local newspaper." 3 Although technology is im-
proving, persuasive proof of cordless phones' reputation for vulnerability
may be found in federal court decisions. Until recently, these decisions held
that cordless phone users retained no expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment.329 It is a logical conclusion that as a result of such
decisions, people are now more careful about what they say over these
phones."l
E-mail has also received a fair amount of publicity for its general lack
of security. The outcry for security measures, including the Clipper Chip
controversy,33' is evidence that confidentiality is among the top concerns
of electronic communications users. This concern may indicate either a
perception that inadequate confidentiality will chill speech, or it may simply
326 Chris O'Malley, The Wireless World: The Information Skyway Is Coming Soon to
a Wireless Device Near You, POPULAR SCI., Nov. 1995, at 56, 56.
327 Cordless Phones (Buyers Guide), GOOD HOUSEKEEPING, Aug. 1995, at 38, 38.
Alexandra Alger, For Your Ears Only (Digital Cordless Phones), FORBES, Oct.
23, 1995, at 358.
329 See United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 176-81 (1992); Junda Woo & Jonathon
M. Moses, Cordless-Phone Users Win Degree of Protection From Eavesdroppers,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1992, at B16.
330 Nevertheless, there are exceptions to this "common sense" argument. A Memphis
couple was charged with conspiracy to murder the woman's husband, after their cord-
less phone conversation was picked up by a police scanner of a another Memphis resi-
dent-who was able to identify the female conspirator as the mother of one of her
daughter's friends. See Margo Kaufman, What Eavesdroppers Know (and You Should
Learn), REDBOOK, May 1995, at 62, 63.
331 See discussion supra part II.B.
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be a backlash against the government's perceived attempt to force users to
relinquish their preferred security measures. The latter interpretation may be
reinforced by the fact that electronic communications users have more con-
trol over keeping their communications confidential, whereas telephone
users are virtually powerless.332 In other words, the protests are a result of
the users not wanting to lose the control they already have, not because they
are afraid of what the government may hear.
As a psychological matter, users' perception of confidentiality strongly
influences how freely they speak through electronic communications. Clear
safeguards will also increase the chances of a successful mandatory encryp-
tion scheme. The government would be perceived as minimizing intrusions
on liberty, and users' fears would look more irrational. The greatest chill on
telephone conversations, for example, seems to result from the lack of phys-
ical, rather than technological, privacy. On balance, people will probably
feel a similar chill with electronic communications as they do with the tele-
phone-assuming it is not a cordless or cellular phone. Nevertheless, addi-
tional security concerns surround electronic communications. For example,
unlike telephone conversations, e-mail can be searched for particular words
or phrases, and a transmission can be downloaded and saved for some future
use. Electronic communications, however, also add an element of anonymity
that is lacking in telephone communications. Technologically, it is possible
to transmit completely anonymous electronic messages.333 Psychologically,
one does not have to reveal their name or address to communicate electroni-
cally, and communication can take place in a completely private set-
ting-such as one's personal computer at home. Moreover, perception of
confidentiality is often colored by the level of trust placed in the govern-
ment. As previously noted, few trust the government with the task of keep-
ing the keys confidential.3"
The probability of a chilling effect and the perception of confidentiality
also depend on other factors, including the identity or sophistication of the
speaker and the subject matter discussed. The identity or sophistication of
the user plays a major role, in that those who are unaware of security risks,
and whose primary use is e-mail as a substitution for regular mail, will not
likely have their speech chilled by a mandatory encryption scheme. On the
other hand, a more sophisticated user of electronic communications, who
participates vigorously in public debate and discussion of unpopular ideas,
332 This is not to say that there are no security measures available for consumers with
respect to telephones, but in general, such measures require buying a telephone with the
security device already hardwired in it. This is not only expensive, but it can also lead
to problems finding someone else with a telephone that can "decode" the conversation.
"' "Completely anonymous" messages refers to the ability to send messages over
computer networks in such a manner that the transmission cannot be traced back to its
point of origin or its author.
... See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
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will more likely be affected. Similarly, the advent of computer networks has
opened a wide forum for debate and arguably has drawn out more peo-
ple-those who may not be comfortable speaking out in a crowd. Thus,
reaction to a mandatory encryption scheme will vary with the speaker, but
because our society values ,all types of expression, the chilling effect argu-
ment is not lessened.
The next factor in determining the chilling effect of mandatory encryp-
tion is the subject matter carried by electronic communications. For exam-
ple, users who are merely substituting e-mail for regular mail probably will
not be concerned with a mandatory encryption scheme. For those engaging
in business, or who are heavily involved in public policy debate or opposi-
tion groups, the ability to speak freely often depends on perceived confiden-
tiality and consequences of monitoring. A lack of confidentiality and the
ability to monitor freely would almost certainly chill business-related
speech, for even though a mandatory encryption scheme would arguably be
content-neutral,33 all of the uncertainties inherent in First Amendment ju-
risprudence are present.
No hard scientific data defines the point at which people will engage in
self-censorship. Although the preceding factors describe perceptions and
emotions, they are illustrative because chilled speech results from fear and
uncertainty of the reaction to such speech. As Schauer notes: "the chilling
effect doctrine flows not from a specific behavioral state of the world, but
from an understanding of the comparative nature of the errors that are
bound to occur." '336 Obviously, the more irrational the fear, the less likely
a chilling effect argument will be successful. Nevertheless, the foregoing
factors should be weighed before the constitutionality of mandatory encryp-
tion is decided. Absent a substantial governmental interest that can be safe-
guarded only by restricting free speech, "[b]ehavioral ignorance or impre-
cision must be resolved in favor of excess permission, not over-restric-
tion. ' 337
CONCLUSION
Just as Pool predicted-as the floodgates of private discourse continue
to open wider in cyberspace, the government is attempting to shut the gates
by controlling encryption. From the government's perspective, the only way
to alleviate the risks underlying completely confidential communications is
through a mandatory encryption scheme. When applying traditional First
Amendment principles, such a scheme looks inherently like a content-neutral
time, place, or manner regulation. Courts will have to balance the
3 See discussion supra notes 229-32 and accompanying'text.
336 Schauer, supra note 307, at 731 (emphasis added).
337 Id.
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government's interest in eliminating threats to law enforcement and national
security against the right to, and need for, a completely private means of
communication, along with any chilling of speech that may occur without
confidentiality guarantees.
Electronic communications as a whole, and encryption in particular,
admittedly do not fit perfectly within the traditional First Amendment frame-
work. The government's harms, though speculative now, are serious and
very much within the realm of possibility. In the long run, it is unimportant
that the First Amendment fit is less than perfect, or that the specified harm
has not come to pass. Rather, it is important to recognize that the First
Amendment's free speech principles are applicable, and ensure that individ-
ual rights are fully, objectively, and rationally considered, and not silenced
solely out of fear or overreaction.
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